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COMMENTS
FISHER’S CAUTIONARY TALE AND THE URGENT NEED
FOR EQUAL ACCESS TO AN EXCELLENT EDUCATION
Kimberly Jenkins Robinson∗
Debates over race-conscious affirmative action in higher education
admissions remain central to discussions about the meaning of equality
and the role of education in advancing equal opportunity.1 These debates continued last Term in the Supreme Court when, for only the
second time in the Supreme Court’s history, the Court held that an institution of higher education may consider an applicant’s race as a factor to achieve diversity’s educational benefits.2 In Fisher v. University
of Texas at Austin (Fisher II),3 the Court held that the University of
Texas had presented sufficient evidence to establish that its pursuit of
the educational benefits of diversity through a race-conscious admissions policy satisfied the Court’s demanding strict scrutiny inquiry.4
Some view Fisher II as cause for celebration and a victory for equal
educational opportunity,5 while those opposed to affirmative action
vow to continue their battle against it and decry such policies as dis–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
∗ Professor, University of Richmond School of Law. Many thanks for the thoughtful comments of Derek Black, Hank Chambers, Jim Gibson, Meredith Harbach, William Koski, Martha
Minow, Eloise Pasachoff, James E. Ryan, Gerard Robinson, Robert Schapiro, and Kimberly
West-Faulcon. I am grateful for Dean Wendy Perdue’s support of research assistance for this
Comment, the thorough and careful research assistance of Victoria Linney, Katie Love, Judd
Peverall, and Rachel Rubinstein, as well as the excellent library assistance of Joyce Manna Janto.
1 See Sumi Cho, From Massive Resistance, to Passive Resistance, to Righteous Resistance:
Understanding the Culture Wars from Brown to Grutter, 7 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 809, 834–35 (2005);
Lani Guinier, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term — Comment: Admissions Rituals as Political Acts:
Guardians at the Gates of Our Democratic Ideals, 117 HARV. L. REV. 113, 135, 140, 202–03 (2003).
2 The first case to uphold the consideration of race in university admissions was Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003). Grutter affirmed the contention by Justice Powell in Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), that approved of the consideration of race
in the admissions policy of Harvard University as an effort to attain student diversity. See
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334–35 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315–17 (opinion of Powell, J.)).
3 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016).
4 Id. at 2210–14.
5 See, e.g., Press Release, Civil Rights Project, UCLA, Statement by Civil Rights Project on
Fisher Decision (June 23, 2016), https://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/news/news-and-announcements
/2016-site-news/statement-by-civil-rights-project-on-fisher-decision [https://perma.cc/C752-BAKT];
Press Release, The Leadership Conference on Civil & Human Rights, Civil and Human Rights
Coalition Applauds Supreme Court Decision in College Diversity Case, (June 23, 2016), http://
www.civilrights.org/press/2016/fisher-ruling.html [https://perma.cc/9P3X-73PB]; Sherrilyn Ifill,
U.S. Supreme Court Ruling Reaffirms the Importance of Diversity in College Admissions, NAACP
LEGAL DEFENSE FUND (June 23, 2016), http://www.naacpldf.org/press-release/us-supremecourt-ruling-reaffirms-importance-diversity-college-admissions [https://perma.cc/94ZV-THAV].
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criminatory.6 Harvard University and the University of North Carolina are currently being sued over their consideration of race in admitting students.7 A coalition of Asian American organizations filed complaints with the United States Department of Education (DOE)
against Brown University, Dartmouth College, and Yale University in
May 2016, alleging race-based discrimination in admissions at these
schools.8 Arizona, California, Florida, Michigan, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, and Washington have banned the consideration of race in
admissions by state universities,9 and the Court has upheld the lawfulness of such bans.10
As these debates continue, it is important to understand that the
Court’s decisions on affirmative action and educational opportunity
establish a fundamental conflict. The Court’s jurisprudence on affirmative action requires an endpoint for affirmative action. In 2003,
the Court in Grutter v. Bollinger11 stated that affirmative action to ensure diversity’s educational benefits must eventually come to end and
suggested that that end point would be twenty-five years after
Grutter.12 In prior opinions, the Court also has noted the importance
of an end to the consideration of race.13 Even if a liberal majority on
the Court extends the life of affirmative action in university admis–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
6 See Robert Barnes, Justices Deliver Surprising Boost to Backers of Affirmative Action,
WASH. POST, June 24, 2016, at A1; Adam Liptak, Justices Uphold Race-Aware Admissions, N.Y.
TIMES, June 24, 2016, at A1; Emma Brown & Danielle Douglas-Gabriel, Affirmative Action Advocates Shocked — and Thrilled — by Supreme Court’s Ruling in University of Texas Case,
WASH. POST (June 23, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2016/06/23
/affirmative-action-advocates-shocked-and-thrilled-by-supreme-courts-ruling-in-university-of
-texas-case [https://perma.cc/EK4E-MJ8B].
7 Complaint, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., No.
1:14-cv-14176 (D. Mass. Nov. 17, 2014); Complaint, Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. Univ. of
N.C., No. 1:14cv00954 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 17, 2014); see also Marina N. Bolotnikova, Harvard’s
Stake in the Fisher v. Texas Affirmative Action Case, HARV. MAG. (June 23, 2016), http://
harvardmagazine.com/2016/06/supreme-court-rejects-abigail-fisher-s-challenge-to-affirmative
-action [https://perma.cc/3GTG-96KJ] (discussing Harvard University’s amicus brief in support of
the University of Texas in Fisher II and the pending litigation against Harvard alleging discrimination against Asian Americans in admissions).
8 Douglas Belkin, Ivy Schools Under Fire on Admissions, WALL ST. J., May 24, 2016, at A2.
9 See ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 36; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 26; NEB.
CONST. art. I, § 30; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 187-A:16-a (2012); WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.400
(2014); Fla. Exec. Order No. 99-281 (Nov. 9, 1999) (Governor Jeb Bush’s “One Florida Initiative”);
David G. Savage, Court Finds Middle Ground on Race, L.A. TIMES, June 25, 2013, at A1. For
additional information on state ballot initiatives on affirmative action, see Affirmative Action:
State Action, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATORS (Apr. 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research
/education/affirmative-action-state-action.aspx [https://perma.cc/CH4K-JH5K].
10 Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1638 (2014).
11 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
12 Id. at 342–43.
13 See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 510 (1989); Wygant v. Jackson
Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986) (plurality opinion); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S.
193, 208–09 (1979).
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sions beyond Grutter’s 2028 deadline, the natural pendulum swings of
the Court’s composition are likely to lead to a conservative-leaning
Court that eventually insists on an end to affirmative action.
Yet despite insistence on an end point for affirmative action, the
Court’s jurisprudence on equal educational opportunity has frustrated
attempts at reform that might eventually obviate the need for affirmative action. Postsecondary institutions consider the race of applicants
in substantial part because of the racial achievement gap between applicants on standardized test scores and the systemic disparities within
elementary and secondary education that cause these gaps.14 The
Court closed a powerful door to addressing those gaps in San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez.15 In Rodriguez, the Court
held that the United States Constitution neither recognizes a right to
education nor provides a remedy for funding disparities between districts in a state.16 While acknowledging the need for state funding reform, Rodriguez left such reforms to the laboratory of the states.17
Although some reform has occurred, this laboratory has too often
proven that states are unwilling to provide the equal access to an excellent education that all children deserve.18 As a result, widespread
racial and socioeconomic disparities in educational opportunity persist
and remain a principal cause of the achievement gap between low–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
14 WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHARE OF THE RIVER: LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY ADMISSIONS 1–3, 18–

23 (1998). Counsel for the University of Texas acknowledged these reasons for the University’s
use of affirmative action at oral argument in Fisher II. Transcript of Oral Argument at 49,
Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (No. 14-981), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument
_t r an s c ri pt s /14-981_onjq.pdf [https://perma.cc/US7U-A2SN]. Justice Sotomayor also acknowledged the standardized test score gap as a factor that made it more difficult to admit
African American students. See id. at 92. Professor Kimberly West-Faulcon’s scholarship has
described “improvement in the technology of mental testing,” Kimberly West-Faulcon, More Intelligent Design: Testing Measures of Merit, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1235, 1272 (2011), and insightfully demonstrated how standardized tests designed according to more accurate theories of intelligence have been shown to reduce the gap between African American and white test scores from
one standard deviation to approximately one half or one fourth of that amount or less with similar
and sometimes better predictive power. See id. at 1272–77.
15 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973). The Court also foreclosed litigation challenges to the disparate racial
impact of educational disparities under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in Alexander v.
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001), when it held that the Act’s disparate impact regulations could not
be enforced in court. Id. at 288–93.
16 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35–37.
17 See id. at 58.
18 See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, Creating New Pathways to Equal
Educational Opportunity, in THE ENDURING LEGACY OF RODRIGUEZ: CREATING NEW
PATHWAYS TO EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 263, 264, 268–70 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr.
& Kimberly Jenkins Robinson eds., 2015) [hereinafter THE ENDURING LEGACY OF
RODRIGUEZ]; Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, Disrupting Education Federalism, 92 WASH. U. L.
REV. 959, 963–64 (2015) (identifying equal access to an excellent education as the proper goal of
education reform and defining this phrase).
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income and minority students and their more affluent and white
peers.19 Therefore, although the Court insists that affirmative action
must eventually end, the Court has washed its hands of the underlying
opportunity gaps that lead institutions to rely on affirmative action.
In this Comment, I argue that much greater care and attention
must be paid to the educational opportunity gaps and resulting
achievement gaps that prompt many colleges and universities to rely
on affirmative action. Increased attention to greater equality and excellence in elementary and secondary education can help reduce or
eliminate the need for affirmative action, which is an approach that
fundamentally aims to ensure equality.20 Without additional attention
to closing opportunity gaps, the Court may declare that the time has
come for affirmative action to end, but the United States will not be
equipped to maintain diverse, selective postsecondary institutions21
and the many benefits that they bring.22
Before presenting a long-term plan to close educational opportunity
and achievement gaps, I explain how, in the near term, it is important
to understand the impact that Fisher II will have on the ability of institutions to achieve diversity in their entering classes. In this regard,
Fisher II offers some assistance to institutions that want to employ affirmative action, but also provides a cautionary tale about the demanding evidentiary burden that these institutions must carry to prevail. Thus, Fisher II should serve less as a cause for celebration and
more as a call to action for those who need to prepare the evidentiary
record and research that defending affirmative action will require.
Given the Court’s insistence on the importance of considering raceneutral alternatives, I also recommend that universities consider “educational disadvantage” as a race-neutral alternative in admissions. I
first describe the educational disadvantages that confront many stu–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
19 See Robinson, supra note 18, at 961–62; Kevin G. Welner & Prudence L. Carter, Achievement Gaps Arise from Opportunity Gaps, in CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY GAP: WHAT
AMERICA MUST DO TO GIVE EVERY CHILD AN EVEN CHANCE 1, 1–3 (Prudence L. Carter &
Kevin G. Welner eds., 2013) [hereinafter CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY GAP]; infra section II.A,
pp. 206–10.
20 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330–33 (2003) (discussing how diversity in higher education institutions helps achieve the important societal aims of making higher education accessible for all races, preparing students for a diverse workforce, and developing diverse leaders); City
of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 510 (1989) (noting that the ultimate aim of the remedial consideration of race is to advance equality). For an early legal analysis of the efforts of
affirmative action to achieve equality, see generally Walter J. Leonard, Introduction: A Step Toward Equality: Affirmative Action and Equal Employment Opportunity, 4 BLACK L.J. 214 (1975).
21 Only an estimated twenty to thirty percent of all four-year institutions are selective. See
BOWEN & BOK, supra note 14, at 15. Most institutions accept all qualified applicants. Id.
22 Id. at 276, 279 (explaining that diverse postsecondary institutions yield such benefits as students learning to interact with individuals of other races in an increasingly diverse society, graduates contributing leadership and civic participation, and the institutions advancing the aims of a
democratic society).
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dents, particularly minority and poor students. I contend that the
Court should not end affirmative action in higher education until these
educational disadvantages are eradicated. I then explore how institutions could consider educational disadvantage in ways that promote
the educational benefits of diversity. As discussed below, research reveals that a variety of forms of educational disadvantage inflict greater
harm on minority students. Universities could structure their recognition of educational disadvantage in admissions in ways that
acknowledge the racial disparities in educational opportunity that
cause the achievement gap, while considering the full scope of educational disadvantages in ways that prevent educational disadvantage
from serving as a proxy for race.
I then present my long-term theory for how to close opportunity
gaps by explaining the need for federal leadership for reform because
of the ineffectiveness of state and local efforts. My theory builds on
federal policymaking strengths, while also creating new forms of state
and local control over education.23 My approach envisions the federal
government serving as the ultimate guarantor of equal access to an excellent education. The federal government would partner with the
states in ways that make achieving this essential national goal a reality.
In addition, the Court should overturn Rodriguez to provide a uniform
federal remedy for closing opportunity gaps. Collectively, these efforts
can help to reduce reliance on affirmative action to address achievement gaps and prepare selective institutions for the eventual demise of
affirmative action.
This Comment proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the admissions program at the University of Texas at Austin and summarizes the
Fisher I24 and II opinions. Part I also analyzes how Fisher II may
benefit universities that seek to consider an applicant’s race among
many factors to assemble a diverse class. Part I examines how, at the
same time, Fisher II may make it harder for universities that do so to
withstand the Court’s demanding evidentiary burden. This Comment
then turns to both a short- and long-term approach that can help institutions and the nation to prepare for the eventual demise of affirmative action. Part II describes the nature and breadth of the educational opportunity gap and contends that, in the short term, universities
should consider educational disadvantage as a positive race-neutral
factor that could assist institutions in assembling a diverse class.
Turning to a longer-term solution, Part III analyzes how the federal
government, including the Supreme Court, should take action that can
close the elementary and secondary educational opportunity and
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
23
24

Robinson, supra note 18, at 984–85, 1014–16.
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher I), 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
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achievement gaps in ways that can help institutions enroll diverse student bodies even after affirmative action ends.
I. A CRITIQUE OF FISHER II’S MIXED MESSAGES
Fisher II sends mixed signals to institutions that employ affirmative action. Several aspects of Fisher II can be interpreted to assist institutions that employ affirmative action. However, Fisher II also applied a demanding evidentiary burden to establish the constitutionality
of affirmative action. This Part begins with a summary of the admissions plan at the University of Texas at Austin and the Fisher I and II
decisions. It then considers the mixed messages within Fisher II and
concludes that it provides a cautionary tale to institutions that employ
affirmative action.
A. Fisher I and II
The Fisher case challenged admissions standards at the University
of Texas at Austin (the University).25 In its ongoing efforts to admit a
diverse student body, the University has employed three programs to
admit candidates in recent decades.26 First, prior to 1997, the
University considered an Academic Index (AI) — which assigns a numerical score to the candidate’s academic performance in high school
and standardized test scores — and the candidate’s race.27 The Fifth
Circuit held in Hopwood v. Texas28 that this approach violated the
Equal Protection Clause because it did not advance a compelling state
interest as required by the Supreme Court for the consideration of an
individual’s race.29
In response to the Hopwood decision, the University ended its consideration of race and developed a Personal Achievement Index (PAI)
to consider along with the AI.30 The PAI involves a holistic review of
how an applicant can contribute to the University by assessing an applicant’s work experience, leadership, extracurricular activities, community service, and awards, as well as any unique circumstances that
provide information on the background of a student.31 The Texas legislature also responded to Hopwood in 1997 by adopting the Top Ten
Percent Law, which offers automatic acceptance to any state university
to any student from Texas who graduates within the top ten percent of
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
25
26
27
28
29
30
31

Id. at 2415.
Id. at 2419–20.
Id. at 2415.
78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2415 (citing Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 955).
See id.
See id. at 2415–16.
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her or his high school class.32 In response, the University revised its
admissions approach to incorporate the Top Ten Percent Law in
1998.33 This approach first admitted students under the Top Ten
Percent Law and admitted the remaining students by combining consideration of the AI and PAI scores.34 This approach did not consider
race.35
After the United States Supreme Court upheld the inclusion of race
as a factor that could be considered within a candidate’s total application to achieve diversity in Grutter,36 the University initiated a oneyear study to determine whether its admissions approach enabled the
University to offer diversity’s educational benefits.37 After concluding
that it was not providing those benefits, the University revised its admissions approach in 2004 to the approach challenged by Abigail Fisher.38 This approach includes an applicant’s race as one element within
the PAI score.39 Once applicants receive a PAI and an AI score, these
combined scores are plotted on a grid and the University admits “[a]ll
students in the cells falling above a certain line.”40
Fisher, who is white, applied to the University of Texas at Austin to
be admitted in 2008 and was denied admission. She sued the
University for considering race when it admits students.41 Fisher argued that this admissions approach violated the Equal Protection
Clause.42 A federal district court granted summary judgment to the
University, and the Fifth Circuit affirmed this decision.43 The Fifth
Circuit’s opinion interpreted Grutter to require courts to defer to the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
32 See id. at 2416 (citing TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 51.803 (West 2009)). The percentage
admitted each year can vary from the ten percent in the initial law. See TEX. EDUC. CODE
ANN. § 51.803(a) (West 2015).
33 Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2205.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003).
37 Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2205.
38 Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2416 (2013).
39 Id. The PAI score is determined by two components: a score on two required essays and a
full-file review that determines the Personal Achievement Score (PAS). Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at
2206. The PAS is determined by a whole file review that examines three factors: (1) the applicant’s essays; (2) supplemental information, such as recommendation letters, writing samples, and
resumes; and (3) an “applicant’s potential contributions to the University’s student body based on
the applicant’s leadership experience, extracurricular activities, awards/honors, community service, and other ‘special circumstances,’” with “special circumstances” including “socioeconomic
status of the applicant’s school, the applicant’s family responsibilities, whether the applicant lives
in a single-parent home, the applicant’s SAT score in relation to the average SAT score at the applicant’s school, the language spoken at the applicant’s home, and, finally, the applicant’s race.”
Id.
40 Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2416.
41 Id. at 2415.
42 Id. at 2417.
43 Id.
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University’s decision regarding both how it defined the benefits of diversity that established a compelling interest and whether the
University’s admissions approach satisfied strict scrutiny’s narrow tailoring requirements.44
In Fisher I, the Supreme Court overturned the Fifth Circuit’s decision and remanded the case.45 The Court held that the University
must satisfy strict scrutiny by proving that the consideration of race
advances a compelling government interest and is narrowly tailored to
achieve that interest.46 It reaffirmed that a court should provide some
deference to a university’s academic decision that diversity’s educational benefits form a critical element of its mission.47 This standard
would require a university to offer a “reasoned, principled explanation
for the academic decision.”48 In overruling the Fifth Circuit, however,
the Court ruled that “no deference” should be given to a university on
whether its approach to achieving diversity’s educational benefits is
narrowly tailored to achieve that goal.49 Instead, a university must
prove that race must be considered to reap diversity’s educational
benefits, and the court must be convinced that “no workable raceneutral alternatives would produce the educational benefits of diversity.”50 In light of the lower court’s erroneous deference to the
University on the narrow tailoring inquiry, the Court remanded the
case to the Fifth Circuit so it could apply the proper interpretation of
strict scrutiny.51 On remand, the Fifth Circuit again upheld the University’s consideration of race in holistic review as necessary to achieve
the diversity that assists its academic mission.52 Fisher again appealed
to the Supreme Court.
In Fisher II, Justice Kennedy wrote an opinion for the Court that
affirmed the Fifth Circuit and highlighted three key legal principles
from Fisher I. First, strict scrutiny requires a university to articulate
“with clarity” that its aim in using race in admissions is both lawful
under the Constitution and compelling, and that the use of race is necessary to accomplish that aim.53 Second, the Court will provide some
deference to the academic judgment to seek “the educational benefits
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
44
45

Id.
Id. at 2421–22. Justice Kagan did not participate in the decision. Id. at 2422. Justices
Scalia and Thomas wrote separate concurring opinions. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 2422–32
(Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg dissented. Id. at 2432–34 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
46 Id. at 2419 (majority opinion).
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 2420.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 2421–22.
52 See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633, 656–57 (5th Cir. 2014).
53 Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2208.
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that flow from student body diversity” and a university’s “reasoned,
principled explanation” for its decision “that a diverse student body
would serve its educational goals.”54 Third, the Court will not give
any deference to a university during the narrow tailoring analysis of
strict scrutiny.55
Justice Kennedy then observed that the University’s program is
“sui generis” because it combines a holistic approach along with a percentage plan.56 Given Fisher’s failure to earn grades within the top
ten percent of her high school class, she did not qualify for over
seventy-five percent of the spaces allocated for the entering class.57
Fisher did not challenge the constitutionality of the Top Ten Percent
Plan. As a result, the Court lacked information about the students
who were admitted under this plan and how they compared to holistic
review admittees in advancing the diversity of the University.58 The
Court declined to remand the case to gather such information because
the remand would result in only three years of data about the differences between these students.59 The Texas Legislature’s adoption of
the Top Ten Percent Plan circumscribed the options for the University’s admissions program, a fact that Justice Kennedy noted “may limit
[the opinion’s] value for prospective guidance.”60
Even though the University was required by law to employ the Top
Ten Percent Plan, it still bore the burden to engage in periodic review
of the legality and effectiveness of its admissions policy. The Court
noted that the University engaged in periodic review of the program.61
It urged the University to continue its ongoing assessment of data and
the experience of students so that the University could modify its admissions program to respond to “changing circumstances” and use race
only to the extent necessary.62
The Court also rejected Fisher’s principal arguments against the
affirmative action plan. The Court disagreed with the contention that
the University had not clearly defined its compelling interest.63 The
University had noted a variety of benefits from enrolling a diverse
student body, including preparing students for the growing diversity
within workplaces and in society, reducing stereotypes, increasing understanding among racial groups, creating leaders with adequate legit–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63

Id. (quoting Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2419).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2209.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2210.
Id.
See id. at 2210–11.
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imacy in the public’s eyes, offering an academic experience that includes a rigorous dialogue, and cultivating experience with other cultures.64 The University determined that its race-neutral admissions
policies had not yielded the educational benefits of diversity. The
Court explained:
Increasing minority enrollment may be instrumental to these educational benefits [of diversity], but it is not . . . a goal that can or should be
reduced to pure numbers. Indeed, since the University is prohibited from
seeking a particular number or quota of minority students, it cannot be
faulted for failing to specify the particular level of minority enrollment at
which it believes the educational benefits of diversity will be obtained.65

The University’s justification for pursuing diversity had established
the “reasoned, principled explanation” for its pursuit of these goals.66
The Court further rejected Fisher’s argument that the University
had achieved a critical mass of diverse students through the Top Ten
Percent Plan combined with holistic review that did not consider race.
The Court noted the extensive review that led the University to determine that the race-neutral policies were unsuccessful.67 The Court also highlighted data that supported the University’s conclusion, including the “consistent stagnation in terms of the percentage of minority
students enrolling at the University from 1996 to 2002.”68 Less than a
quarter of the courses with five or more students at the University included more than one African American student.69 Minority students
admitted under the race-neutral approaches reported feeling isolated
and lonely.70 The Court acknowledged the careful assessment that the
University had undertaken and agreed that the University could reasonably conclude that it had not attained diversity’s benefits.71
The Court also dismissed the argument that the consideration of
race had only a limited impact on diversity, reasoning that after the
University adopted race-conscious holistic review, enrollment of
Hispanics increased by fifty-four percent and enrollment of African
Americans increased by ninety-four percent.72 The Court also rejected
the suggestion that race-neutral alternatives were available to the
University given that the University had employed such approaches

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72

See id.
Id. at 2210.
Id. at 2211 (quoting Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013)).
Id. at 2211–12.
Id. at 2212.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id.
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for seven years and had found that they did not achieve the benefits of
diversity.73
Justices Thomas and Alito dissented. Justice Thomas would have
overruled Grutter and found that the University’s consideration of race
is prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause.74 Justice Alito wrote a
lengthy dissent, which Justice Thomas joined, criticizing the
University for failing to articulate its goals with sufficient clarity to
enable the Court to determine whether the goals had been met and for
being unable to prove how the Top Ten Percent Plan did not achieve
its goals.75 He opined that the University could have achieved diversity’s educational benefits through such race-neutral alternatives as increasing the number of students that are admitted through the Top
Ten Percent Plan beyond seventy-five percent of the entering class, increasing the emphasis on socioeconomic factors, and employing additional outreach measures.76 Justice Alito contended that given the
demanding evidence required to satisfy strict scrutiny, the case should
have been remanded for additional fact finding on what occurred during the three years of admissions when the University returned to considering race within its holistic review and what diversity goals were
not met by the admission of significant numbers of minority students
under the Top Ten Percent Plan.77
B. How Fisher II Helps Institutions that Choose to Employ
Affirmative Action
Fisher II provides assistance to institutions that must defend affirmative action in admissions policies. Like Fisher I, Fisher II reaffirmed that diversity’s educational benefits can serve as a compelling
government interest.78 Fisher II clarified that diversity is not “a goal
that can or should be reduced to pure numbers.”79 Therefore, universities are not required to establish numerical goals for their affirmative
action plans given the risk of such numbers being labeled quotas.80
Instead, the Court appears willing to accept such benefits of diversity
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
73
74
75

Id. at 2212–13.
Id. at 2215 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2222–24, 2239–40, 2241–42 (Alito, J., dissenting). Along with Justice Thomas, Chief
Justice Roberts joined Justice Alito’s dissent.
76 Id. at 2236. Justice Kennedy noted that the seventy-five percent limit was set by statute.
Id. at 2206 (majority opinion).
77 Id. at 2239–40 (Alito, J., dissenting).
78 See id. at 2210–11 (majority opinion); Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013).
79 Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2210.
80 Id.; Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The Constitutional Future of Race-Neutral Efforts to
Achieve Diversity and Avoid Racial Isolation in Elementary and Secondary Schools, 50 B.C. L.
REV. 277, 289 (2009) (noting that an elementary or secondary school that identifies desirable levels
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as creating a diverse cadre of leaders, increasing understanding among
the races, reducing stereotypes, and preparing students to enter a diverse workforce as goals that are sufficiently concrete.81 This clarification in Fisher II will enable universities to avoid what I previously
identified as the Scylla of inadequate evidence on the racial composition they need to achieve diversity and the Charybdis of significant
specificity on this issue that the program is labeled an unconstitutional
quota.82
Fisher II also lays bare the deficiencies of percentage plans.
Justice Kennedy acknowledged the multiple flaws inherent to these
plans. He noted that percentage plans rely on a single measure that
can prevent universities from considering the broad array of factors
that diversity seeks, thereby echoing Grutter’s acknowledgment of this
same shortcoming.83 Justice Kennedy also recognized that such plans
aim to increase minority enrollment by admitting the top graduates
from racially isolated high schools.84 Given this explicit racial aim, increasing reliance on the Top Ten Percent Plan would not have made
the University’s admissions policy “more race neutral.”85 He highlighted that such plans create “perverse incentives” for students by discouraging them from selecting challenging classes or a more competitive school.86 In addition, Fisher II’s rejection of the contention that
the University should increase its admittees from the Top Ten Percent
Plan reaffirms Grutter’s instruction that universities and colleges are
not required to choose a race-neutral alternative that sacrifices assembling a class with a broad range of characteristics solely to achieve diversity.87 Justice Kennedy’s thorough exploration of the shortcomings
of percentage plans suggests that future litigants will not succeed by
pointing to such plans as viable race-neutral alternatives.
Fisher II did not mention the need for a termination point for affirmative action. Instead, it emphasized that the University should
regularly evaluate its admissions policy in light of its ongoing data collection on the need for affirmative action.88 The Court’s silence in
Fisher II about any durational limits on affirmative action, rather
than reaffirming the importance of a termination point or Grutter’s
2028 endpoint, may allow institutions to employ affirmative action beyond the 2028 deadline as long as they are engaging in periodic review.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2210.
Robinson, supra note 80, at 290.
Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2213; Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 340 (2003).
Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2213.
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Id. at 2214.
Id. at 2212–13; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 340.
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Most importantly, Fisher II provides much-needed guidance on the
types of evidence that colleges and universities will need to present in
court to survive a constitutional challenge given the minimal guidance
in Grutter.89 For instance, the Court in Fisher II reviewed a thorough
record on the inefficacy of some race-neutral efforts, such as outreach
and scholarship programs.90 Although each university will likely need
to establish that it either attempted such efforts or carefully studied
their potential impact and determined that they would be ineffective at
enhancing diversity, the Court may be more likely to conclude that
such efforts are ineffective after Fisher II. In addition, Fisher II affirmed that university officials should carefully gather a wide variety
of data and evidence about why affirmative action is necessary at their
schools.91 This could include data on the aspects of diversity that
race-neutral approaches are not yielding, evidence from faculty on the
impact of a lack of diversity in their classes, and surveys and interviews with minority students about their experiences on campus in
both diverse and nondiverse settings.
Universities also must be prepared to provide data establishing that
their affirmative action programs have a significant effect on admitted
and enrolled students, given that the Court in Fisher II considered it
important that the University of Texas at Austin’s data showed a substantial increase in African American and Hispanic enrollment after
the University returned to considering race within its admissions process.92 This contrasts with the Court’s decision to strike down the affirmative action plans in Parents Involved in Community Schools v.
Seattle School District No. 193 in part because the school districts
could not show that the consideration of race had a significant effect.94
By clearly establishing the evidence that universities must present to
successfully defend the constitutionality of their race-conscious admissions programs, Fisher II offers an instructive roadmap for university
officials.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
89 See Mark W. Cordes, Affirmative Action After Grutter and Gratz, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REV.
691, 732 (2004); Euel W. Elliott & Andrew I.E. Ewoh, Beyond Gratz and Grutter: Prospects for
Affirmative Action in the Aftermath of the Supreme Court’s Michigan Decisions, 22 REV. POL’Y
RES. 541, 551 (2005); Peter Lehmuller & Dennis E. Gregory, Affirmative Action: From Before
Bakke to After Grutter, 42 NASPA J. 430, 430 (2005).
90 Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2213.
91 Id. at 2210. Grutter also noted that universities need to demonstrate that the use of race
was necessary to achieve diversity. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 340–42.
92 Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2212.
93 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
94 Id. at 734.
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C. Fisher II’s Cautionary Tale for Affirmative Action
Despite these potential benefits, however, Fisher II also erected
new hurdles. Fisher II increased the evidentiary burdens for universities and colleges to prove the interrelated requirements that the consideration of race is necessary and that they faithfully assessed workable race-neutral alternatives beyond the standard required in Grutter.
To understand the heightened evidentiary standard that Fisher II imposed, one first has to understand the Court’s standard in Grutter.
Grutter determined that the University of Michigan Law School
(the “Law School”) satisfied the requirement that considering race was
necessary to secure diversity’s benefits. The Court noted that “[t]he
Law School has determined, based on its experience and expertise, that
a ‘critical mass’ of underrepresented minorities is necessary to further
its compelling interest in securing the educational benefits of a diverse
student body.”95 This statement reflects the Court’s deference to the
Law School’s “experience and expertise” that diversity serves as an essential means for the Law School to accomplish its mission.96 The
Court then acknowledged that it was calibrating its narrow tailoring
analysis to the context of university admissions programs by taking account of differences in such programs from other types of affirmative
action programs.97 The defensible rejections of a lottery system, the
percentage plans used by undergraduate institutions in several states,
and a reduction in reliance on the LSAT and grades supported the
Court’s conclusion that the consideration of race was necessary for the
Law School.98 The Court also was satisfied that a university’s periodic review of its admissions process would help it continue to assess the
necessity of considering race, given Grutter’s requirement that a raceconscious admissions policy must include a reasonable limit on the duration of the policy.99
The Court’s analysis explicitly extended some deference to the Law
School on the necessity requirement. This deference is evidenced by
the Court’s statement that “[w]e take the Law School at its word that
it would ‘like nothing better than to find a race-neutral admissions
formula’ and will terminate its race-conscious admissions program as
soon as practicable.”100 The Court’s statement suggests a degree of
trust in the Law School’s assertions that diversity could not be accomplished by any other means and that the Law School would end af–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
95
96
97
98
99
100

Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333.
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Id. at 333–34.
Id. at 340.
Id. at 342.
Id. at 343 (quoting Brief for Respondents at 34, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (No. 02-241), 2003
WL 402236, at *34).
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firmative action as soon as it could assemble a diverse class without its
race-conscious admissions program.
Grutter similarly did not hold the Law School to a demanding
standard when it concluded that the Law School had given sufficient
consideration to race-neutral alternatives. Instead, the Court agreed
with the Law School’s reasons for rejecting three other approaches.
The Court’s opinion confirmed that a lottery approach and a reduction
in the weight given to grades and LSAT scores would lead to a substantial reduction in diversity, the academic qualifications of the entering class, or both.101 The Court also acknowledged that the percentage plans used in Texas, Florida, and California would prevent the
Law School from individually assessing each applicant in ways that
would enable it to enroll students with a broad range of diverse qualities.102 The Court additionally questioned whether a percentage plan
would work for a professional school, such as the Law School, or for
other graduate programs.103
Grutter did not explain why the rejection of these race-neutral alternatives established that the Law School had given adequate consideration to race-neutral alternatives, nor what would be required for
proving good faith consideration in the future.104 For instance, although Grutter noted that the Law School should learn from the approaches used in states that have banned affirmative action, Grutter
did not describe those approaches, other than percentage plans, and
did not explain why those approaches, with the exception of percentage plans, would have been ineffective means for the Law School to
enroll a diverse class.105
The Court’s deference to the Law School is further evident in the
Court’s statement that a university must prove “serious, good faith
consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives that will achieve
the diversity the university seeks.”106 This formulation of the standard
acknowledges that the Court offered credence — rather than skepticism — to the Law School’s testimony in this regard. In addition, by
taking the Law School “at its word” that it would like to switch to
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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See George La Noue & Kenneth L. Marcus, “Serious Consideration” of Race-Neutral Alternatives in Higher Education, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 991, 992–93 (2008); Curt A. Levey, Troubled
Waters Ahead for Race-Based Admissions, 9 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 63, 67 & n.20 (2004).
105 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342.
106 Id. at 339. The necessity requirement is related to the good faith consideration of raceneutral alternatives requirement because proving that it is necessary to consider race to achieve
diversity’s benefits requires showing that race-neutral alternatives could not achieve the goal. See
Eang L. Ngov, Following Fisher: Narrowly Tailoring Affirmative Action, 64 CATH. U. L. REV. 1, 8
(2014).
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race-neutral alternatives, the Court showed great confidence in the
Law School’s ability to police itself, even though the narrow tailoring
analysis is supposed to accomplish a strict judicial policing of the use
of race.107
Perhaps Grutter’s approach to race-neutral alternatives is best explained by its instruction that “[n]arrow tailoring does not require
exhaustion of every conceivable race-neutral alternative.”108 Alternatively, this approach might be explained by the fact that the Court
seemed to attribute some good faith to the Law School when it assessed the viability of race-neutral alternatives.109 Whatever the reason, this approach raised the question of how much good faith consideration of race-neutral alternatives was enough to satisfy the Court.
Grutter’s failure to clarify what evidence was needed to show good
faith consideration of race-neutral alternatives led some scholars to
speculate about the types of evidence that institutions should gather to
satisfy this requirement.110
The Court in Fisher I moved away from this deferential approach,
and in Fisher II applied a more demanding evidentiary analysis than
that of Grutter. In Fisher I, the Court remanded after rejecting the
Fifth Circuit’s deference to the University in the narrow tailoring
analysis.111 Scholars noted that this represented a significant shift in
the Court’s approach to affirmative action.112 Instead of deferring to
institutions on the narrow tailoring inquiry, Fisher I installed the
courts as the final arbiters of this inquiry.113
Fisher I also raised the evidentiary bar on the consideration of
race-neutral alternatives. Fisher I held that a “court must ultimately
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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See Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2421 (2013).
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Race-Conscious Action Is Often Necessary, 22 NAT’L BLACK L.J., no. 1, 2009, at 1, 37–38; La
Noue & Marcus, supra note 104, at 1040–41.
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112 See, e.g., Vinay Harpalani, Narrowly Tailored but Broadly Compelling: Defending RaceConscious Admissions After Fisher, 45 SETON HALL L. REV. 761, 814 (2015) (explaining that “the
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Fisher v. University of Texas: Who Put the Holes in “Holistic”?, 9 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB.
POL’Y (SPECIAL ISSUE) 31, 51–52 (2013) (“The clear insistence that courts must not defer to that
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113 See john a. powell & Stephen Menendian, Fisher v. Texas: The Limits of Exhaustion and
the Future of Race-Conscious University Admissions, 47 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 899, 909 (2014).
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be satisfied that no workable race-neutral alternatives would produce
the educational benefits of diversity.”114 As several scholars noted, this
formulation shifted away from Grutter’s good faith assessment of raceneutral alternatives and trust in institutions in undertaking this inquiry, and instead replaced this approach with an exhaustion requirement that increased the difficulty of defending affirmative action.115
Fisher II applies this searching inquiry to the evidence that the
University presented to prove necessity and to show the absence of
available race-neutral alternatives. The University actually implemented race-neutral approaches for seven years.116 It presented various types of evidence to show that it had not achieved diversity’s benefits during this time. It conducted a year-long review to assess this
issue.117 The University engaged in “months of study and deliberation,
including retreats, interviews, [and] review of data.”118 The Court noted that the University experienced ongoing stagnation in the enrollment of minorities when it employed a race-neutral approach.119 This
stagnation undermined the University’s capacity to include a diversity
of perspectives within each entering class.120 The University also provided evidence that minority students admitted using race-neutral holistic review reported significant isolation and loneliness.121 Furthermore, a study of small classes at the University found that “only 21
percent of undergraduate classes with five or more students in them
had more than one African-American student enrolled. Twelve
percent of these classes had no Hispanic students, as compared to 10
percent in 1996.”122 The Court found that the University had conducted a careful assessment of whether it was achieving diversity and
had reasonably concluded that considering race was necessary to
achieve diversity.123
If this is the new evidentiary threshold to establish the necessity of
affirmative action, Fisher II sets a high bar in several ways. First, in
addition to reaffirming the Fisher I pronouncement that no deference
is applied within the narrowly tailored analysis, the Court in Fisher II
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2420.
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reviewed data over the seven years in which affirmative action was
suspended.124 Seven years provided a substantial period of time for
the University to assess the impact of its race-neutral efforts. When
these efforts did not yield diversity’s educational benefits, the
University possessed significantly stronger evidence that it must consider race than a university would have based on hypothetical assessments of what might happen if an institution did not consider race.
For instance, the Court noted the substantial increase in the percentage of Hispanics and African Americans admitted through holistic review once race was considered, with Hispanics showing a fifty-four
percent increase and African Americans showing a ninety-four percent
increase.125 These increases established that considering an applicant’s
race had a “meaningful, if still limited,” impact on the diversity of the
University.126 Although the University of Michigan Law School admissions policy upheld in Grutter did not have evidence from several
years of eliminating affirmative action, it is unclear whether evidence
of the actual impact of race-neutral alternatives will become the effective gold standard. Even if it does not, after Fisher II what evidence
will be sufficiently persuasive to prove that the use of race is necessary
when multiple race-neutral alternatives have not been implemented
and proven unsuccessful?
Second, the University presented multiple types of data and research to support its conclusion that it needed to consider race. Even
if the Court had rejected one or two types of evidence — such as the
study of small classes or student interviews — the Court still had substantial evidence from demographic data and retreats to support its
judgment. This suggests the wide array of evidence that the Court
will likely expect from future litigants. For instance, the University
provided a “39-page proposal” to support its return to affirmative action after its year-long study.127 The Court’s inclusion of the page
length of this report suggests that the Court found the proposal’s
length probative of the thorough and careful nature of its analysis.128
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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Third, Fisher II also provides a careful record of the many raceneutral alternatives that the University actually implemented that
proved ineffective. For instance, the University increased its recruiting
of minority students and its budget for such efforts. It held more than
1000 events to recruit students.129 The University also established
three new scholarships that were aimed at diversifying the student
body.130 It created regional centers to assist with admissions.131 These
efforts demonstrate a substantial commitment of resources, personnel,
and finances to admitting a diverse student body.
Justice Kennedy’s review of the race-neutral alternatives in Fisher
II suggests that the Court will be looking for far more extensive efforts
from future universities and colleges than the efforts that it accepted
from the Law School in Grutter. Although Justice Kennedy acknowledged Grutter’s statement that every race-neutral alternative did not
have to be exhausted, he also noted that a university must demonstrate
that “workable” and “available” race-neutral alternatives would not
accomplish the benefits of diversity.132 It is unclear what evidence will
be required of universities to prove this point, but Fisher II suggests
that the Court will be expecting a considerable investment of a university’s capital and staff to prove that potential race-neutral alternatives
are not workable.
It could be the case that, to satisfy the Court on this issue, a university or college must first implement several race-neutral alternatives
that ultimately prove ineffective to achieve diversity’s educational
benefits, and carefully study how other approaches would impact diversity. After Fisher II, institutions undoubtedly are admonished to
match the University of Texas’s deep commitment to pursuing such alternatives in ways that are feasible given the size and resources of each
institution. Institutions must also provide persuasive evidence of why
these efforts did not yield the educational benefits of diversity.
The fourth reason that Fisher II sets a high evidentiary bar is that
the opinion acknowledged that race was a “‘factor of a factor of a factor’ in the holistic-review calculus” of the University’s admissions policy.133 However, in states where the consideration of race has not been
banned, universities may be employing an approach much closer to the
admissions plan upheld in Grutter and the Harvard University approach that considered race as one factor among many factors, as dis–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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cussed approvingly in Bakke.134 Because the University of Texas at
Austin considered race as a factor within an admissions factor in a
multifactored process, Fisher II raises the possibility that the Court
could strike down a plan if a university affords race a significantly
greater weight than the University of Texas at Austin did such that
race influences substantially more admissions decisions. A harbinger
of this approach can be found in the Court’s comment that “[t]he fact
that race consciousness played a role in only a small portion of admissions decisions should be a hallmark of narrow tailoring, not evidence
of unconstitutionality.”135 This new hallmark may serve as a stumbling block to institutions that consider race throughout the admissions
process.
Finally, the Court repeatedly noted that the University must continually gather and assess additional data and information, and tailor
its admissions approach in response to this evidence.136 For example,
the Court’s opinion undoubtedly envisions the University gathering information in the future on the types of diversity that the University is
able to accomplish through the Top Ten Percent Plan as compared to
the race-conscious holistic review. This evidence was not demanded in
Fisher II because Ms. Fisher did not challenge the Top Ten Percent
Plan.137 This suggests that despite the broad array of evidence provided in Fisher II, that same evidence may not be sufficient in a future
case challenging the totality of the University’s admissions policy.
Fisher II suggests that the warm reception that the University of
Michigan Law School’s admissions plan received in Grutter has likely
ended. In its place, Fisher II offers a cautionary tale of the Court’s
plans to implement a closer and more demanding scrutiny of evidence
and statistical data regarding the necessity to consider an applicant’s
race and the absence of viable race-neutral alternatives. Fisher II’s
insistence on such thorough data and research on these issues may
chill the use of affirmative action on campuses that want to avoid the
risks of litigation or the costs of preparing a potential defense.138 If
Fisher II has such a chilling effect, it will contribute to the eventual
demise of affirmative action on some college campuses.
In the short term, Fisher I and II may make it more difficult for
institutions to defend affirmative action. Moreover, even if Fisher II
ultimately guides institutions on how to satisfy strict scrutiny — as I
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
134 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 330, 340 (2003); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
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hope it does — rather than serves as a cautionary tale, the regular
shifts in the Court’s composition along with its jurisprudence that requires an eventual endpoint for affirmative action ultimately will lead
to the demise of affirmative action. Given this reality, the United
States should adopt comprehensive and far-reaching reforms to remedy the educational opportunity disparities that cause the achievement
gaps that lead some institutions to rely on affirmative action. The next
Part explores the nature of these gaps and proposes an approach for
institutions to explicitly acknowledge opportunity gaps in admissions
in ways that may enhance diversity.
II. UNDERSTANDING EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY GAPS
AND HOW THEY CAN SERVE AS RACE-NEUTRAL
FACTORS THAT MAY ENHANCE DIVERSITY
Educational opportunities within the United States are not distributed equally, rationally, or fairly. Instead, zip codes, socioeconomic
status, race, and geography often define whether a child receives a
world-class education or a substandard one.139 Opportunity gaps leave
many students behind as the economy moves away from low-skill jobs
and toward jobs that require higher-order thinking.140 In addition, the
United States pays a high cost for the low-quality education that it
provides to many children. These costs often take the form of higher
health care spending, lost income and tax revenues, increased housing
and welfare assistance, greater crime, and less civic participation,141 as
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
139 EQUITY & EXCELLENCE COMM’N, FOR EACH AND EVERY CHILD: A STRATEGY FOR
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140 See Thomas Bailey, Implications of Educational Inequality in a Global Economy, in THE
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27 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 22–24) (citing, for example, PEW
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well as a failure to prepare students adequately for military service142
and to protect our security interests.143
Before the Court declares that the time for affirmative action has
come to an end, the United States must first close the educational opportunity gaps and the resulting achievement gaps that lead many institutions to rely on affirmative action. Achieving these goals should
enhance the ability of institutions to achieve diverse student bodies
without affirmative action. In addition, using the achievement of these goals as the predicate for dismantling affirmative action would also
prevent the Court from choosing an arbitrary end date that willfully
ignores the underlying educational disparities and challenges that lead
institutions to turn to affirmative action.
In this Part, I describe some of the disparities in educational opportunity and achievement in the United States with an emphasis on racial disparities. I then explain how postsecondary institutions could
consider the nature of an applicant’s educational disadvantage as a
positive admissions factor that may enhance diversity.
A. Educational Opportunity and Achievement Gaps
Racial minorities more often experience a wide range of disadvantages within schools. These disadvantages are evident in the
teacher quality that many minority students receive. Latino and African American students are approximately twice as likely as their white
or Asian peers to attend schools with over twenty percent of the teachers in their first year of teaching,144 and students attending schools
with high concentrations of minority students are twice as likely to be
assigned to new teachers.145 Indeed, “[b]y every measure of qualifications — certification, subject-matter background, pedagogical training,
selectivity of college attended, test scores, or experience — lessqualified teachers are found in schools serving greater numbers of
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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low-income and minority students.”146 These disparities in teacher
quality adversely affect the achievement of minority and low-income
students.147
Minority students also typically experience greater access to vocational and remedial courses and less access to challenging academic
classes, rigorous curricula, and courses that prepare students for college.148 Remedial courses often are geared toward lower-level cognitive skills and prepare students for low-status jobs, while more rigorous curricula yield higher-order skills and prepare students with the
skills that the “global knowledge economy”149 demands.150 Although
there has been a significant increase in the number of African American and Hispanic students taking at least one AP exam,151 African
American and American Indian students are more likely to attend high
schools without a complete AP program, with complete defined as offering at least one AP class in science, mathematics, social science, and
English.152 In addition, the College Board, which administers AP Exams, found that African American students who graduated in 2013
were “the most underrepresented group in AP classrooms and in the
population of successful AP Exam takers.”153 Only 57% of African
American students and 67% of Hispanic students enjoy access to the
complete range of science and math courses offered, while 81% of
Asian students and 71% of white students enjoy such access.154 More
college counseling is provided to students in rigorous courses, such as
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
146 LINDA DARLING-HAMMOND, THE FLAT WORLD AND EDUCATION: HOW AMERICA’S
COMMITMENT TO EQUITY WILL DETERMINE OUR FUTURE 43 (2010).
147 See id.
148 Id. at 52, 57–59 (noting that minority students enjoy less access to honors, gifted and talented, and advanced placement courses while they experience overrepresentation in special education
courses); U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 144, at 6–7; Lynne
Bland & Anne Neve, Equity and Access for Minority Students in AP Courses, 5 J. CROSSDISCIPLINARY PERSP. IN EDUC. 21, 22–23 (2012).
149 See DARLING-HAMMOND, supra note 146, at 52, 54, 56–57 (quoting TONY WAGNER,
THE GLOBAL ACHIEVEMENT GAP: WHY EVEN OUR BEST SCHOOLS DON’T TEACH THE
NEW SURVIVAL SKILLS OUR CHILDREN NEED — AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 8
(2008) (emphasis omitted)).
150 See id. at 52, 54, 56–57.
151 NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., STATUS AND TRENDS IN
THE EDUCATION OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC GROUPS 76 (2010).
152 EDUC. TR., FINDING AMERICA’S MISSING AP AND IB STUDENTS 4 (2013).
153 COLL. BD., THE 10TH ANNUAL AP REPORT TO THE NATION 30 (2014), http://media
.c oll e ge b o ard .c o m/di gi t al Ser vi ce s/pd f/ ap /rtn/ 10th -ann ual/ 10th - an nual-ap-rep ort - t o-th e -n a ti o n
-single-page.pdf [https://perma.cc/7PTD-5JJE].
154 U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, CIVIL RIGHTS DATA COLLECTION:
DATA SNAPSHOT (COLLEGE AND CAREER READINESS), ISSUE BRIEF NO. 3, at 8 (2014),
http://ocrdata.ed.gov/Downloads/CRDC-College-and-Career -Readiness-Snapshot.pdf [https://
perma.cc/X9K2-3274]. The full range of math and science courses are Algebra I, Geometry,
Algebra II, Calculus, Biology, Chemistry, and Physics. Id.
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students in honors, AP, or college preparatory courses.155 Given the
weighting of advanced courses and the complexities of the college application process, these disparities hinder the application and entrance
of minority students into colleges and universities.
Minority students also experience higher rates of suspension and
expulsion, as well as more exposure to safety concerns in their schools,
such as gangs and weapons. Although 42.8% of African American
students and 21.9% of Hispanic students have been suspended, only
15.6% of white students have been suspended.156 Even though only
1% of white students have been expelled, 12.8% of African American
students have been expelled.157 African American and Hispanic students are more than twice as likely to attend a school where gangs are
present, with 37.6% of African American and 36.1% of Hispanic students attending such schools compared to 16% of white students.158
African American and Hispanic students are more likely to be threatened or injured with a weapon in school than white students are.159
These discipline and safety factors create more difficult learning environments for many African American and Hispanic students in ways
that can adversely influence their focus on academic achievement.
Nationally, districts that educate the most minority students receive
approximately $2000 less per pupil than districts that serve the fewest
minority students.160 However, funding disparities vary significantly
between states, with eighteen states providing significantly less funding to districts that serve the most minority students while fourteen
states provide more money to districts that serve the most minority
students.161 A research consensus has emerged that money matters
for education because of the influential resources that it can purchase,162 and the longstanding debate over whether money matters has
shifted to how money should be spent most efficiently to improve student achievement.163 In addition, research by Professors C. Kirabo
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
155 Andrea Venezia & Michael W. Kirst, Inequitable Opportunities: How Current Education
Systems and Policies Undermine the Chances for Student Persistence and Success in College, 19
EDUC. POL’Y 283, 293 (2005).
156 NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 151, at 93.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 115.
159 Id. at 114.
160 NATASHA USHOMIRSKY & DAVID WILLIAMS, EDUC. TR., FUNDING GAPS 2015: TOO
MANY STATES STILL SPEND LESS ON EDUCATING STUDENTS WHO NEED THE MOST 8
(2015); see also RAEGEN MILLER & DIANA EPSTEIN, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, THERE
STILL BE DRAGONS: RACIAL DISPARITY IN SCHOOL FUNDING 3 (2011) (“Meaningful levels
of racial disparity clearly exist in the provision of school funds in some states.”).
161 See USHOMIRSKY & WILLIAMS, supra note 160, at 8.
162 See BRUCE D. BAKER, ALBERT SHANKER INST., REVISITING THAT AGE-OLD QUESTION: DOES MONEY MATTER IN EDUCATION?, at iv-v (2012).
163 Ogletree & Robinson, supra note 18, at 267.
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Jackson, Rucker C. Johnson, and Claudia Persico reveals that increases in funding can result in significant increases in education and earnings as well as reductions in adult poverty.164 Furthermore, minority
students make up a disproportionate share of many large school districts that experience limited access to textbooks, overcrowding, and
poorly maintained facilities.165
High-poverty learning environments also provide additional disadvantages for a disproportionate number of minority students. Only
7.64% of white students attended high-poverty schools in 2014, while
42.62% of minority students attended such schools.166 High-poverty
learning environments consistently perform worse than other schools
and often lack effective teachers, adequate resources, appropriate class
sizes, and motivated and engaged parents, as well as other factors that
improve student achievement.167 Such environments also are affected
by a host of out-of-school challenges such as higher crime rates, inadequate healthcare, greater mobility, and more instability within the
home.168 High-poverty schools exert a negative influence on student
achievement independent of a student’s socioeconomic status.169
These educational opportunity gaps play a substantial role in creating
and sustaining the racial achievement gap.170 While some students are
educated in schools that far surpass state learning standards, others
are relegated to opportunities that emphasize the basics and teaching
to the test.171 These disparities in opportunity will lead many white
and affluent students to higher-order thinking skills while many poor
and minority students are left to basic, rote thinking and test preparation.172 Leading education scholar Professor Linda Darling-Hammond
summarizes the connection well, noting that “when the evidence is examined, it is clear that educational outcomes for these [minority] students are at least as much a function of their unequal access to key ed–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
164 C. Kirabo Jackson, Rucker C. Johnson & Claudia Persico, The Effects of School Spending
on Educational and Economic Outcomes: Evidence from School Finance Reforms, 131 Q.J.
ECON. 157, 160 (2016).
165 Linda Darling-Hammond, Inequality and School Resources: What It Will Take to Close the
Opportunity Gap, in CLOSING THE OPPORTUNITY GAP, supra note 19, at 77, 83–84.
166 Indicators: School Poverty, NAT’L EQUITY ATLAS, http://nationalequityatlas.org
/indicators/school_poverty [https://perma.cc/9TZZ-93CU].
167 DARLING-HAMMOND, supra note 146, at 37; RYAN, supra note 139, at 277–78; DarlingHammond, supra note 165, at 77, 82; GARY ORFIELD ET AL., UCLA CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT,
E PLURIBUS . . . SEPARATION: DEEPENING DOUBLE SEGREGATION FOR MORE STUDENTS
26–27 (2012).
168 DARLING-HAMMOND, supra note 146, at 37; RYAN, supra note 139, at 158.
169 Darling-Hammond, supra note 165, at 82–83.
170 Welner & Carter, supra note 19, at 1–3.
171 See RYAN, supra note 139, at 259.
172 See id. at 260.
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ucational resources, both inside and outside of school, as they are a
function of race, class, or culture.”173
Most selective institutions continue to rely on the standardized SAT
or ACT.174 On the SAT, a substantial racial gap exists in all three subject areas.175 More importantly, the size of the SAT achievement gap
has remained relatively stable from 1986–1987 to 2013–2014.176 On
the ACT, a far lower percentage of African American and Hispanic
students met the ACT college readiness benchmark, as compared to
white or Asian students on math, science, English, and reading.177
The test score gap on the ACT also has remained relatively stable for
the last decade.178 College entrance exam disparities are unsurprising
given the persistence of the gap in elementary and secondary achievement scores.179 Overall, African American and Latino applicants face

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
173 DARLING-HAMMOND, supra note 146, at 30; see also John B. Diamond, Still Separate and
Unequal: Examining Race, Opportunity, and School Achievement in “Integrated” Suburbs, 75 J.
NEGRO EDUC. 495, 497 (2006) (“The educational experiences of African Americans are tied to
the structural, institutional, and symbolic consequences of being African American in the U.S. It
is the cumulative weight of these forces that combine to shape (and at times, undermine) African
American opportunity and achievement.”).
174 Jonathan P. Epstein, Behind the SAT-Optional Movement: Context and Controversy, J.C.
ADMISSION, Summer 2009, at 8, 9.
175 For the 2013–2014 school year, on average, whites scored 534 on the math section, Asians
and Pacific Islanders scored 598, African Americans scored 429 and non–Mexican American Hispanics scored 459. On critical reading, whites scored 529, Asians and Pacific Islanders scored 523,
while African Americans scored 431 and non–Mexican American Hispanics scored 451. On writing, whites scored 513, Asians and Pacific Islanders scored 530, African Americans scored 418,
and non–Mexican American Hispanics scored 443. THOMAS D. SNYDER ET AL., NAT’L CTR.
FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., DIGEST OF EDUCATION STATISTICS 2014, at
301 (2016). Beginning with the SAT administrations in 2016, the College Board has designed the
SAT to include three sections: evidence-based reading and writing, math, and an essay. Press Release, The College Board, The College Board Announces Bold Plans to Expand Access to Opportunity; Redesign of the SAT (Mar. 5, 2014), https://www.collegeboard.org/releases/2014/expandopportunity-redesign-sat [https://perma.cc/QF9H-H9HQ].
176 See SNYDER ET AL., supra note 175, at 301.
177 Fourteen percent of African Americans and 29% of Hispanics met the ACT college readiness benchmark in math, compared to 52% of whites and 69% of Asians. For science, 12% of
African Americans and 23% of Hispanics met the benchmark, compared to 48% of whites and
57% of Asians. In reading, 19% of African Americans and 31% of Hispanics met the benchmark,
compared to 56% of whites and 57% of Asians. In English, 34% of African Americans and 47%
of Hispanics met the benchmark, compared to 75% of both whites and Asians. NAT’L ACT, THE
CONDITION OF COLLEGE & CAREER READINESS 2015, at 7 (2015).
178 NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., supra note 151, at 85.
179 But see NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., NAEP 2012:
TRENDS IN ACADEMIC PROGRESS: READING 1971–2012, MATH 1973–2012, at 16 (2013) (finding that the racial achievement gap on the National Assessment of Educational Progress has narrowed since the early 1970s).
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many more hurdles to successful entrance to higher education than
whites.180
B. Weighting Educational Disadvantage
Within Selective Postsecondary Admissions
Under the Court’s current jurisprudence, universities and colleges
must consider race-neutral alternatives before resorting to affirmative
action.181 One innovation I propose is that institutions should consider
an applicant’s educational disadvantage as a positive admissions factor
that may enhance diversity.182 At a minimum, considering this approach will help institutions respond to the Court’s insistence that they
prove that no viable alternative to affirmative action exists.183 In addition, if such an approach assists an institution in reducing their reliance on race, an institution could demonstrate that it is relying on race
as little as possible.184 Furthermore, the Court’s prior pronouncements
on the limited-duration requirement admonish selective postsecondary
institutions to prepare for the day when the Court declares that
the time has come for affirmative action to end.185 Considering
educational disadvantage can serve as one way to prepare for affirmative action’s end. Finally, this approach also enables institutions to
mitigate the impact of disparities in educational opportunities for
applicants.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
180 Eric Grodsky & Michal Kurlaender, The Demography of Higher Education in the Wake of
Affirmative Action, in EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN HIGHER EDUCATION 33, 57 (Eric Grodsky &
Michal Kurlaender eds., 2010). Universities and colleges also could independently consider the
racial isolation of high schools. Research reveals that racially isolated schools oftentimes provide
inferior educational experiences and produce inferior results, and thus universities and colleges
could consider the racial isolation of a high school as one type of disadvantage. See, e.g., NAT’L
ACAD. OF EDUC., RACE-CONSCIOUS POLICIES FOR ASSIGNING STUDENTS TO SCHOOLS:
SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH AND THE SUPREME COURT CASES 18 (Robert L. Linn & Kevin
G. Welner eds., 2007); Jomills Henry Braddock II & Tamela McNulty Eitle, The Effects of School
Desegregation, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH ON MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION 828, 828
(James A. Banks & Cherry A. McGee Banks eds., 2004); Maureen T. Hallinan, Diversity Effects
on Student Outcomes: Social Science Evidence, 59 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 741–42 (1998); Amy Stuart
Wells & Erica Frankenberg, The Public Schools and the Challenge of the Supreme Court’s Integration Decision, 89 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 178, 180–83 (2007). However, although the racial isolation
of an applicant’s high school does not consider the race of the applicant, a court might conclude
that considering the race of the applicant’s high school is sufficiently tied to an applicant’s race
that this consideration should be considered to be a race-based factor, rather than a race-neutral
factor.
181 Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2420 (2013).
182 During oral argument in Fisher II, counsel for Fisher suggested, without elaboration, that
institutions should consider educational disadvantage. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note
14, at 28–29.
183 Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2420.
184 Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2212.
185 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 342 (2003).
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1. How to Weight Educational Disadvantage in Postsecondary
Admissions. — Currently, selective colleges and universities consider a
broad array of factors when admitting a class. Academic preparedness
serves as a key credential.186 Most institutions consider grade point
average (GPA) more heavily than the other factors in a student’s record, and admissions officers rely on the courses that a student took to
contextualize the GPA.187 Class rank also typically informs the consideration of GPA because it helps institutions understand a high
school’s grading policy.188 Class rank is evaluated in light of the number of students within the high school class as well as the quality of
the high school that a student attends.189 The SAT and ACT also provide critical information for most institutions on college preparedness,190 although some, including Justice Alito in his Fisher II dissent,
criticize consideration of these scores because of their adverse impact
on minority students.191 Leadership experience and potential also are
desirable qualities for most selective colleges and universities.192 Additional factors that selective institutions consider include personal essays, past employment, extracurricular participation, family income
and background, geographic location, civic engagement, awards, and
honors, as well as recommendation letters from teachers.193 Many institutions also consider an applicant favorably if a parent or other relative attended the institution.194
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
186
187

BOWEN & BOK, supra note 14, at 23–24.
ROBERT J. STERNBERG, COLLEGE ADMISSIONS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 35, 40
(2010).
188 Id. at 39.
189 Id.
190 Id. at 44.
191 See Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2233–34, 2234 n.11 (Alito, J., dissenting); see also JAMILLAH
MOORE, RACE AND COLLEGE ADMISSIONS: A CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 19 (2005)
(noting that relying on tests such as the SAT gives an admissions advantage to white students,
that “SAT scores do not reliably predict who will successfully complete a college education,” that
many institutions have eliminated reliance on test scores, and that some institutions have eliminated these scores from admissions decisions due to concern regarding the scores’ negative impact
on race and gender equity); West-Faulcon, supra note 14, at 1295 n.230 (arguing that “universities
should just stop relying on . . . theoretically flawed factorist tests” that produce racial disparities
in outcomes); cf. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 369–70 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (criticizing the University of Michigan Law School for relying on the LSAT
despite the relatively low scores of African Americans and then attempting to overcome this
through affirmative action).
192 BOWEN & BOK, supra note 14, at 24.
193 Id. at 25; MOORE, supra note 191, at 16.
194 BOWEN & BOK, supra note 14, at 24; MOORE, supra note 191, at 164. The consideration of
“legacy” as a positive admissions factor has been criticized as privileging white, affluent students.
See generally AFFIRMATIVE ACTION FOR THE RICH: LEGACY PREFERENCES IN COLLEGE
ADMISSIONS (Richard D. Kahlenberg ed., 2010) (presenting critiques of admissions policies that
benefit alumni); MOORE, supra note 191, at 164 (noting that the limited number of minority
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Colleges and universities consider the quality of an applicant’s high
school based on information that is typically submitted by a counselor
that provides a profile for the high school.195 This profile may include
the geographic and demographic makeup of the school, the curriculum
and course offerings, an explanation of the grading scale, how enrollment in advanced coursework is determined, average standardized test
scores, the colleges and universities prior graduates attended, and
awards and honors earned by students.196 In addition, high schools also may submit information such as teacher credentials, pupil-teacher
ratio, and the extracurricular activities provided.197 An institution also
can choose to create a profile for a high school as an aid in university
admissions.198
Some admissions practices consider the quality of an applicant’s
high school as information that provides context for a student’s application, such as a student’s class rank and GPA.199 In addition to the
profiles submitted, admissions officers also may possess informal
knowledge of the quality of high schools, sometimes gathered from
brief visits to high schools or prior applications from the high
school.200 This information may or may not accurately capture the intellectual rigor of the students and the caliber of the high school.201
This information may lead an admissions officer to explicitly or subconsciously increase the GPA from a well-regarded school or discount
a GPA from an unknown or disfavored school.202
A survey of college admissions officers regarding how admissions
officers assess a variety of student characteristics indicates that the
quality of an applicant’s high school sometimes — but not consistent–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
alumni from elite institutions results in very few minority students being able to take advantage
of legacy preferences).
195 Jon Fortenbury, Does Your High School’s Quality Affect Where You Can Get Into College?,
USA TODAY (May 30, 2013, 11:00 AM), http://college.usatoday.com/2013/05/30/does-your-high
-schools-quality-affect-where-you-can-get-into-college [https://perma.cc/LRG5-WSWJ].
196 The College Board provides a sample high school profile. See Sample High School Profile,
COLLEGE BOARD, h t tps : // pr o fe s s io n al s . c o ll e ge b o ar d . o r g/ g ui d an c e/c o un s e li n g/ pr o fi l e/ s am p l e
[https://perma.cc/ZHT6-XZX6].
197 Fortenbury, supra note 195.
198 For instance, the University of California (UC) Berkeley staff create complex profiles for
each California high school that include such information as the percentage of seniors who took
AP exams and those who scored three or higher, the average SAT score, the percentage of lowincome children, and the percentage of English Language Learners. Admissions officers use this
information to compare a candidate’s application to those in her high school as well as the entire
applicant pool. See BOB LAIRD, THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION IN UNIVERSITY
ADMISSIONS 238 (2005).
199 STERNBERG, supra note 187, at 36–39.
200 LAIRD, supra note 198, at 237.
201 See id. at 231, 237.
202 STERNBERG, supra note 187, at 38.
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ly — provides context for assessment of an applicant.203 The results
reveal that 38.9% of colleges give no consideration to the applicant’s
high school and 33.7% view it as having only limited importance.204
Only a small percentage — 3.3% — view an applicant’s high school as
a factor of considerable importance and 24.1% view it as a factor of
moderate importance.205 Interestingly enough, the survey of factors
that colleges consider most important for admission does not include
an applicant’s high school as an admissions factor.206 Instead, it identifies sixteen factors that focus on grades and standardized test scores,
recommendations, extracurricular activities, and an interview.207 This
data, as well as other research,208 suggests that high school quality
sometimes is considered informally to provide context but is not typically considered as a weighty admissions factor by most institutions.
As a race-neutral alternative to affirmative action, admissions officers could consider educational disadvantage as a positive factor in
admissions. For instance, attending a high-poverty school should be
included as an indicator of educational disadvantage given the research revealing the adverse effects of such schools.209 Institutions
also could assign positive weight to limited access to advanced
coursework, the quality and experience of teachers within a school,
and high suspension rates as factors that likely hindered a student’s
achievement and thus deserve positive weight within the admissions
decision.
Admissions officers could provide an admissions preference for educational disadvantage in two ways. First, the presence of educational
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
203 MELISSA CLINEDINST, NAT’L ASS’N FOR COLL. ADMISSION COUNSELING, STATE OF
COLLEGE ADMISSION 35 (2015).
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 Id. at 28.
207 The sixteen factors are grades in college prep courses, strength of curriculum, admission test
scores (SAT, ACT), grades in all courses, essay or writing sample, student’s demonstrated interest,
counselor recommendation, class rank, teacher recommendation, extracurricular activities, interview, subject test scores (AP, IB), portfolio, SAT II scores, state graduation exam scores, and
work. See id.
208 See STERNBERG, supra note 187, at 36, 39 (explaining that the meaning of a student’s GPA
and class rank can vary depending on the quality of the high school and the students in the
school); Michal Kurlaender et al., Access and Diversity at the University of California in the Post–
Affirmative Action Era, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND RACIAL EQUITY: CONSIDERING THE
FISHER CASE TO FORGE THE PATH AHEAD 80, 86 (Uma M. Jayakumar et al. eds., 2015) (noting that UC Berkeley assesses each applicant “in the specific context of his or her high school circumstances”); Roger E. Studley, Inequality, Student Achievement, and College Admissions: A
Remedy for Underrepresentation 4 (Ctr. for Studies in Higher Educ.: Research & Occasional Paper Series, CSHE.1.03, Feb. 2003), http://www.cshe.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/shared
/publications/docs/ROP.Studley.1.03.pdf [https://perma.cc/U2KM-PNN7] (stating that many colleges and universities “instruct application readers to evaluate each candidate with respect to his
or her circumstance”).
209 See supra notes 166–173 and accompanying text.
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disadvantage could expand the pool of students that are identified as
academically qualified for admission. For example, an applicant who
performed well academically within the context of the opportunities
that she was given and who took full advantage of available opportunities could be considered qualified even though she did not take as
many AP classes as her competitors because they were not offered at
her school. This might lead admissions officers to consider a wider array of GPAs as acceptable given evidence that many students cannot
earn the additional points that advanced placement classes provide.
Second, once a student is determined to be qualified, if an applicant
performed well within available opportunities, admissions officers also
could consider educational disadvantage as a factor that supports an
admissions advantage.210
This proposal would benefit students of all races because all races
experience a variety of forms of educational disadvantage.211 However, this proposal also would particularly assist in increasing the admissions opportunities of minority students because of the frequent
convergence of race and inferior educational opportunities within the
United States described above.212 Given that students of all races experience these disadvantages, this approach could not credibly be labeled a proxy for race. But for some institutions, this approach may
yield a significant number of admissions for minority students because
minority students disproportionately experience these disadvantages.213
To implement this proposal, universities and colleges would need to
request three additional types of information. First, institutions should
include a question to high school counselors that asks them to describe
the nature and scope of any educational disadvantages of the school.
This question could be added to high school profiles. Admissions
counselors typically assess thousands of applications. Such a question
would prevent admissions officers from having to discern and calculate
educational disadvantage from what is not offered by the high school
or by the quality of what is provided. In addition, high school counse–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
210 This proposal provides a means to operationalize recognition of the adverse impact that educational disadvantage can have on an applicant. John T. Yun & José F. Moreno, College Access,
K-12 Concentrated Disadvantage, and the Next 25 Years of Education Research, 35 EDUC. RESEARCHER 12, 18 (2006). This proposal also complements the recommendations that colleges
and universities consider low socioeconomic status, Studley, supra note 208, at 25, as well as firstgeneration college student status as positive admissions criteria, Brown-Nagin, supra note 115, at
498.
211 See EQUITY & EXCELLENCE COMM’N, supra note 139, at 12–14 (noting that students
“who attend schools in high poverty neighborhoods are getting an education that more closely
approximates school in developing nations,” id. at 12).
212 See supra section II.A, pp. 206–10.
213 See DARLING-HAMMOND, supra note 146, at 36–37; Yun & Moreno, supra note 210, at 12.
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lors would only need to provide this statement annually and it could
be included in all student applications.
Second, for an accurate assessment of educational disadvantage to
occur, institutions should ask that additional information be included
in high school profiles. For instance, although some high school profiles include teacher credentials, the sample profile provided by the
College Board does not include teacher credentials or experience.214
Yet research reveals that teacher quality, including preparation for
teaching, experience, certification status, and academic background,
has a tremendous impact on student achievement.215 This information
would help colleges assess who was taught by high-quality teachers
and who may have been hindered by the quality of her or his instruction. A description of the nature, quality, and access to instructional
materials, such as technology, textbooks, library and classroom resources, the pupil-to-counselor ratio, and the quality of the facilities
would further enhance an effective assessment of the breadth of educational disadvantage that an applicant experienced.216
Finally, colleges and universities should ask counselors to include a
few sentences or a paragraph on how long an applicant has experienced educational disadvantages and the disadvantages that the
applicant personally experienced. Is the applicant a student who experienced educational disadvantages throughout her education or one
who only experienced them early or late in her education? This can
help admissions officers determine how much of a positive weight to
assign to educational disadvantage.
Some of the state universities that were forced to end the consideration of race have adopted admissions reforms that are consistent with
this proposal.217 The percentage plans in use in Texas, Florida, and
California serve as powerful admissions advantages for educationally
disadvantaged high schools by automatically admitting students from
relatively low-quality high schools.218 The state university systems of
California, Florida, and Washington also consider some aspects of ed-

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
214
215
216

See Sample High School Profile, supra note 196.
DARLING-HAMMOND, supra note 146, at 43–44.
Cf. LAIRD, supra note 198, at 237–38 (recommending that colleges and universities create
complete profiles of high schools from available data).
217 Many universities also target recruiting to disadvantaged high schools that typically have
substantial minority enrollment. Mark C. Long, Essay, Affirmative Action and Its Alternatives in
Public Universities: What Do We Know?, 67 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 315, 319–20 (2007).
218 See id.
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ucational disadvantage within their admissions practices.219 Other
universities also may consider educational disadvantage.220
For those universities and colleges that currently consider educational disadvantage, the additional information that would be gathered
under my proposal would allow admissions officers to make a far more
accurate assessment of educational disadvantage. In addition, the dual
consideration of educational disadvantage by admissions officers —
once when deciding who is qualified and once as an admissions preference of varying degree depending on the scope and duration of the educational disadvantage — would serve as a more effective recognition
of the breadth of educational disadvantage suffered by many students
than is offered by universities that only consider educational disadvantage in one of these two ways. Although this approach would impose costs on high schools and postsecondary institutions, I demonstrate in the next section how the benefits of this approach would outweigh its costs.
2. The Costs and Benefits of Weighting Educational Disadvantage. — Considering educational disadvantage as a positive admissions factor would impose several costs for both secondary schools as
well as postsecondary institutions. For high schools, assessing educational disadvantage would increase the burden on high school counselors to create the additional information needed to provide more detailed profiles of high schools. It also would take time for counselors
to note on an individual basis how long students had experienced educational disadvantage and any specific noteworthy instances of disadvantage, such as a student being academically prepared to take an advanced course but unable to enroll due to it not being offered at the
school. Furthermore, if this approach were used robustly, it might be
criticized for incentivizing parents to leave their children in lowquality educational environments, just as the percent plans are criticized for encouraging parents to keep their children in lowerperforming schools.221
Postsecondary institutions also would bear substantial costs.
Postsecondary institutions might choose to develop technology to gath–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
219

Id. at 319; Joni James, Governor Stands by One Florida, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 28, 2002, at

1A.
220 Studley, supra note 208, at 4. Although Roger Studley, the Coordinator of Research and
Evaluation for the UC Office of the President, states that many universities and colleges currently
instruct admissions officers to consider socioeconomic factors by assessing an application in light
of the applicant’s circumstances or giving additional points for a disadvantaged educational experience, id., the survey data of college admissions officers noted above indicates that this practice
may not be as widespread as he suggests and instead may be more predominant within the UC
system than outside of it, see supra notes 203–208 and accompanying text.
221 Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2214 (quoting Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 304 n.10 (2003)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting)).
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er the additional information provided by secondary schools. Such
technology would require investments in the creation and maintenance
of software and training in how to gather and present this information
in the most useful format. Admissions officers also would need adequate time to assess the additional information to determine how much
weight to give a student’s disadvantage.
In addition, institutions would need to conduct assessments of
whether this race-neutral alternative would enhance diversity given
their particular applicant pools. Creating a model to assess the potential impact of such an approach would also require an investment of
resources, personnel, and time. Accepting applicants with lower credentials than the standard applicant could impact an institution’s U.S.
News & World Report ranking — a possibility that may influence
an institution’s willingness to weight educational disadvantage given
that most selective institutions are determined to maintain their
rankings.222
Finally, the success of such a program would be dependent on offering sufficient academic and financial support for students who were
admitted in part due to the educational disadvantage that they experienced. Racial disparities in the quality of high schools have been
shown to influence the postsecondary achievement gap.223 Institutions
would need to invest resources in and provide support for students
who experienced educational disadvantage to enable these students to
succeed.224 This support would build on research showing that some
disadvantaged students can be successful at selective postsecondary institutions.225 Although socioeconomically disadvantaged students are
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
222 See Guinier, supra note 1, at 144–45 (discussing how rankings “exercise significant influence
over educational institutions,” id. at 145).
223 Jason Fletcher & Marta Tienda, Race and Ethnic Differences in College Achievement: Does
High School Attended Matter?, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., Jan. 2010, at 144, 161
(“Our main hypothesis — that differences in the quality of high schools attended by minority versus majority students contribute to the collegiate achievement gaps — finds considerable
support.”).
224 Sigal Alon & Marta Tienda, Assessing the “Mismatch” Hypothesis: Differences in College
Graduation Rates by Institutional Selectivity, 78 SOC. EDUC. 294, 309 (2005).
225 See JENNIFER GIANCOLA & RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG, JACK KENT COOKE
FOUND., TRUE MERIT: ENSURING OUR BRIGHTEST STUDENTS HAVE ACCESS TO OUR
BEST COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES 1, 8–10 (2016), h t t p : / / w w w . j k c f . o r g / a s s e t s / 1 / 7 / J K C F
_true_merit_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/U4AD-28KC] (finding that low-income, high-achieving
students graduate at similar rates to higher-income, high-achieving students at highly competitive
institutions, that graduation rates increase for low-income, high-achieving students as the selectivity of the institution increases, and that low-income students are assisted by the additional retention efforts, particularly counseling, that selective institutions offer); Alon & Tienda, supra note
224, at 306, 309. For instance, evidence from Texas indicates that African American and Hispanic
students as well as disadvantaged students admitted through the Top Ten Percent Plan typically
earned lower test scores than “[w]hite students and graduates from affluent and feeder high
schools ranked at or below the third decile of their class.” Sunny X. Niu & Marta Tienda, Minor-
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less likely to complete college and sometimes experience lower grades
than their more advantaged peers,226 research reveals that the graduation rates of socioeconomically disadvantaged students increase as the
selectivity of the institution increases.227 Furthermore, given that acceptance rates for graduate and professional schools increase as the selectivity of an applicant’s postsecondary institution increases and that
students at more selective institutions experience a small advantage in
wage earnings when compared to students at less selective institu–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
ity Student Academic Performance Under the Uniform Admission Law: Evidence from the University of Texas at Austin, 32 EDUC. EVALUATION & POL’Y ANALYSIS 44, 64 (2010). Yet the
“top 10% admits consistently performed as well as or better than their lower ranked counterparts.” Id. at 64–65; see also id. at 55–57. But see RICHARD SANDER & STUART TAYLOR, JR.,
MISMATCH: HOW AFFIRMATIVE ACTION HURTS STUDENTS IT’S INTENDED TO HELP,
AND WHY UNIVERSITIES WON’T ADMIT IT 3–4, 33–48 (2012) (discussing research showing
what the authors call “mismatch,” that is, research indicating that “large racial preferences backfire against many and, perhaps, most recipients, to the point that they learn less and are likely to
be less self-confident than had they gone to less competitive but still quite good schools,” id. at 3–
4). A variety of scholars have criticized and critiqued the work of Professor Richard Sander and
his coauthor. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Richard Brooks, Response, Does Affirmative Action Reduce
the Number of Black Lawyers?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1807, 1809 (2005) (“While the mismatch hypothesis is plausible, this response refutes the claim that affirmative action has reduced the number of black lawyers. We find no persuasive evidence that current levels of affirmative action
have reduced the probability that black law students will become lawyers.”); David L. Chambers
et al., Response, The Real Impact of Eliminating Affirmative Action in American Law Schools: An
Empirical Critique of Richard Sander’s Study, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1855, 1898 (2005) (“In his conclusion, Sander claims that ‘the production of black lawyers would rise significantly in a world
without racial preferences,’ because African American law students, no longer ‘mismatched’ at
the schools they attend, would graduate and pass the bar at much higher rates. His conclusions
are simple, neat, and wrong. As we have demonstrated here, they rest on a seriously flawed appraisal of the current evidence. We believe that, using the same evidence, we have demonstrated
just the opposite: that, without affirmative action, both the enrollment of African American law
students (particularly at the fifty or eighty most selective schools) and the production of African
American lawyers would significantly decline.” (footnote omitted) (quoting Richard H. Sander, A
Systemic Analysis of Affirmative Action in American Law Schools, 57 STAN. L. REV. 367, 476
(2004))); William C. Kidder & Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Still Hazy After All These Years: The Data and Theory Behind “Mismatch,” 92 TEX. L. REV. 895, 896 (2014) (reviewing SANDER &
TAYLOR, supra) (“Our comprehensive review will show that the authors of Mismatch cherry-pick
the data to support a series of unwarranted claims, for the social science data overall (and particularly the best peer-reviewed works) do not support Sander and Taylor’s assertions that affirmative
action causes lower overall college graduation rates or earnings for African Americans and
Latinos.”).
226 NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., POSTSECONDARY ATTAINMENT: DIFFERENCES BY SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS 1 (2015), http://nces.ed.gov/programs
/coe/pdf/coe_tva.pdf [https://perma.cc/L5J4-VAQ8]; Marvin A. Titus, Understanding College Degree Completion of Students with Low Socioeconomic Status: The Influence of the Institutional
Financial Context, 47 RES. HIGHER EDUC. 371, 388, 392–93 (2006); MaryBeth Walpole, Socioeconomic Status and College: How SES Affects College Experiences and Outcomes, 27 REV.
HIGHER EDUC. 45, 63 (2003).
227 Anthony P. Carnevale & Stephen J. Rose, Socioeconomic Status, Race/Ethnicity, and Selective College Admissions, in AMERICA’S UNTAPPED RESOURCE: LOW-INCOME STUDENTS IN
HIGHER EDUCATION 101, 108–09 (Richard D. Kahlenberg ed., 2004).
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tions,228 increasing the admission of and support for educationally disadvantaged students could enable more disadvantaged students to experience the benefits of attending a selective institution.
Despite these costs, the benefits of providing an admissions advantage based on a complete picture of the nature and scope of educational disadvantage warrant its consideration by most institutions. Institutions should consider these benefits especially given the
widespread nature of educational disadvantage and evidence that
many colleges and universities do not consider educational disadvantage.229 Such an approach would yield numerous benefits. First,
an admissions advantage for educational disadvantage recognizes the
reality that “individual college opportunity is predicated on K-12 institutional opportunity.”230 Many students are hindered in their ability to
enter and succeed in higher education because their elementary and
secondary education prepared them only for low-skilled, low-paying
jobs. Economic forecasts indicate that such jobs will continue to diminish and that high-level thinking skills will be essential for successful employment.231 Postsecondary education provides an essential way
to develop these skills.232 Assigning a positive weight to educational
disadvantage helps to mitigate the impact of educational opportunity
gaps.
Second, this approach might also encourage more low-income students to apply to selective postsecondary institutions. Research reveals
that low-income students are more likely to attend two-year colleges or
no college than high-income peers while students with a higher socioeconomic status are more likely to attend a selective four-year college.233 However, the weighting of educational disadvantage does not
guarantee admission as the percentage plans do. Thus, this approach
should substantially reduce any perverse incentives to keep children in
low-quality schools. Although some parents may be willing to leave
their child in an inferior educational environment to gain an admis–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
228
229

Id. at 109–15.
See CLINEDINST, supra note 203, at 27–28, 34–35 (failing to include educational disadvantage on the list of the most important factors for college admissions and finding that 72.6% of
colleges considered a student’s high school to be of limited to no importance).
230 Patricia M. McDonough, Counseling and College Counseling in America’s High Schools, in
NAT’L ASS’N FOR COLL. ADMISSION COUNSELING, STATE OF COLLEGE ADMISSION 107,
110 (David A. Hawkins & Jessica Lautz eds., 2005).
231 Bailey, supra note 140, at 74, 78–79, 92–93.
232 McDonough, supra note 230, at 108 (“[S]ix out of every 10 jobs in our economy depend on
highly trained workers with the requisite advanced skills that are available only to those possessing either a two-year or four-college [sic] degree.”).
233 JONATHAN SMITH ET AL., COLL. BD. ADVOCACY & POLICY CTR., A REVIEW OF THE
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF STUDENTS’ POSTSECONDARY CHOICES 6 (2012), https://
research.collegeb oard.or g/sites/default/files/publications/20 14/ 9/ l i t e r a t u r e - c a u s e s - c o n s e q u e n c e s
-students-postsecondary-choices.pdf [https://perma.cc/QHM3-QVCS].
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sions advantage, most parents will understand that obtaining the best
educational opportunities for their child is the greatest way to ensure
their child’s acceptance to and success in postsecondary education.
Third, providing an admissions advantage to students from educationally disadvantaged high schools also allows universities to serve
their larger social responsibilities, including supporting democratic
ideals of equal opportunity and fairness, promoting societal mobility,
and preparing leaders for a wider array of communities.234 Some colleges and universities are increasing their emphasis on how students
contribute to the lives of others at home and in their communities.235
Acknowledging and valuing educational disadvantage provides a tangible way for universities to signal that they are acting to promote the
common good. In addition, this approach would increase the relatively small number of institutions that give a systemic preference to disadvantaged students.236
Fourth, by considering educational disadvantage in admissions,
universities would be in a stronger position to address the Court’s insistence that universities establish that no viable race-neutral alternatives are available to achieve diversity’s benefits.237 Systematic consideration of educational disadvantage would serve as evidence that a
university has heeded the Court’s instruction to learn from states
where affirmative action has been prohibited.238 The opposition to affirmative action will undoubtedly continue and universities must be
prepared with ample evidence that they explored alternative approaches that avoided considering an applicant’s race.
Fifth, some universities that consider educational disadvantage as a
positive admissions factor could reduce their reliance on affirmative
action. Such a reduction would be a positive development for institutions given Fisher II’s instruction that “a hallmark of narrow tailoring” should be that “race consciousness played a role in only a small
portion of admissions decisions.”239
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
234
235

See BOWEN & BOK, supra note 14, at 23–24; Guinier, supra note 1, at 135–36, 223.
MAKING CARING COMMON PROJECT, HARVARD GRADUATE SCH. OF EDUC., TURNING THE TIDE: INSPIRING CONCERN FOR OTHERS AND THE COMMON GOOD THROUGH
COLLEGE ADMISSIONS 8 (2016), http://mcc.gse.harvard.edu/files/gse-mcc/files/20160120_mcc_ttt
_report_interactive.pdf [https://perma.cc/M69N-VUK5].
236 See GIANCOLA & KAHLENBERG, supra note 225, at 1 (“Being admitted to a selective institution is actually harder for the high-achieving, low-income student than for others. We were also
surprised by both the extent of the individual disadvantages and the uniformity of approach
across all highly selective colleges and universities reviewed.”); see also Carnevale & Rose, supra
note 227, at 101–02.
237 Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2420 (2013).
238 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 342 (2003). For a discussion of postsecondary admissions approaches in states that have banned affirmative action, see Long, supra note 217, at 319–
20.
239 136 S. Ct. at 2212.
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Finally, the additional assistance required for students who have
experienced educational disadvantage also could incentivize university
leaders to serve as advocates for effective K-12 reforms that reduce the
need for and costs of college and university support of these students.
Some universities have already begun to take on such reforms by partnering with elementary and secondary schools in ways that can improve student outcomes.240 Universities possess a wide array of resources that can help disadvantaged schools, including faculty and
staff expertise, extensive libraries, athletic facilities, and student volunteers. Partnerships would be encouraged as universities and colleges
increase their understanding of the breadth of educational disadvantage. Furthermore, increasing the number of students at selective
institutions who experienced educational disadvantage could expose all
students to a broader array of elementary and secondary backgrounds
in ways that contribute to the learning experiences in classrooms and
on campuses.
Ultimately, the effectiveness of this approach for enhancing diversity will depend on a variety of factors that vary by institution. In some
applicant pools, educational disadvantage may disproportionately
harm minority applicants, and this approach would enhance the diversity of the entering class. In other applicant pools, educational disadvantage may be spread evenly among the races or may disproportionately impact white applicants such that diversity will not be enhanced
by assigning it an admissions preference. A selective state institution
in Mississippi or Alabama may have greater success in employing this
alternative than a state institution in Massachusetts or Connecticut
due to the higher number of minorities241 and the historical convergence of discrimination and educational disadvantage in the first two
states.242
Research confirms that some selective institutions have been able to
consider socioeconomic disadvantage in ways that enhance diversity.243
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
240 GIANCOLA & KAHLENBERG, supra note 225, at 32; Halley Potter, Transitioning to RaceNeutral Admissions: An Overview of Experiences in States Where Affirmative Action Has Been
Banned, in THE FUTURE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: NEW PATHS TO HIGHER EDUCATION
DIVERSITY AFTER FISHER V. TEXAS 75, 87 (Richard D. Kahlenberg ed., 2014).
241 NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., DIGEST OF EDUCATION
STATISTICS: TABLE 203.70 (2015), http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d15/tables/dt15_203.70.asp
[https://perma.cc/Z9J7-J8AN].
242 U.W. Clemon & Bryan K. Fair, Making Bricks Without Straw: The NAACP Legal Defense
Fund and the Development of Civil Rights Law in Alabama 1940–1980, 52 ALA. L. REV. 1121,
1138–44 (2001); Crystal R. Sanders, Forum, “Money Talks”: The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 and the African-American Freedom Struggle in Mississippi, 56 HIST. EDUC. Q.
361, 362, 364 (2016).
243 See RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG & HALLEY POTTER, CENTURY FOUND., A BETTER
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: STATE UNIVERSITIES THAT CREATED ALTERNATIVES TO RACIAL
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Research also indicates that some selective institutions would not be
able to consider socioeconomic disadvantage in ways that enhance diversity, and that consequently these institutions may not benefit from a
sophisticated assessment of educational disadvantage.244 For example,
a university with a national applicant pool that receives a larger number of white applicants that have experienced educational disadvantage than minority applicants may have less success employing this
tool. The disparate results from the research suggest that, although
this approach will not yield diversity’s benefits for all institutions, it
may prove fruitful at some institutions as a way to reduce or eliminate
their reliance on affirmative action.245
Ultimately, reducing or eliminating the reliance of postsecondary
institutions on affirmative action is unlikely to occur on a wide scale
until the nation addresses the opportunity and achievement gaps that
lead many institutions to employ affirmative action. Therefore, I offer
in the next Part a comprehensive approach for closing these gaps.
III. A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO CLOSE THE
OPPORTUNITY GAPS THAT ENCOURAGE
THE USE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Although numerous scholars have argued that the use of affirmative action should not be of limited duration,246 the Court’s affirmative
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
PREFERENCES 12, 15–17, 50 (2012); Matthew N. Gaertner & Melissa Hart, Considering Class:
College Access and Diversity, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 367, 378, 399–400 (2013).
244 BOWEN & BOK, supra note 14, at 46–52, 280; WILLIAM G. BOWEN ET AL., EQUITY AND
EXCELLENCE IN AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION 178–86 (2005); SEAN F. REARDON ET
AL., CAN SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS SUBSTITUTE FOR RACE IN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
COLLEGE ADMISSIONS POLICIES? EVIDENCE FROM A SIMULATION MODEL 19–20 (2015);
William C. Kidder, How Workable Are Class-Based and Race-Neutral Alternatives at Leading
American Universities?, 64 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 100, 105–09 (2016).
245 Testing the empirics of whether this approach would work at most selective institutions is
beyond the scope of this Comment.
246 See, e.g., Vikram David Amar & Evan Caminker, Constitutional Sunsetting?: Justice
O’Connor’s Closing Comments in Grutter, 30 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 541, 543–44 (2003) (“Diversity, unlike remedy, is a justification that is not temporally linked to past events; whereas remedy
looks to the past, diversity looks to the educational benefits today and in the future.” Id. at 543.);
Vinay Harpalani, Narrowly Tailored but Broadly Compelling: Defending Race-Conscious Admissions After Fisher, 45 SETON HALL L. REV. 761, 775–76 (2015) (noting that the reasons cited in
Grutter for supporting affirmative action — including better preparation for students to participate in a diverse workforce and greater legitimacy of civic institutions — “will probably become
even more important as America becomes a more diverse society,” id. at 775); Kevin R. Johnson,
The Last Twenty Five Years of Affirmative Action?, 21 CONST. COMMENT. 171, 183–84 (2004) (“A
time limit does not, however, well fit enhancing diversity, which administers not a remedy but an
inherent academic value.” (quoting Martin Michaelson, The Court’s Pronouncements Are More
Dramatic and Subtle Than the Headlines, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., July 18, 2003, at B11));
Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Argot of Equality: On the Importance of Disentangling “Diversity” and “Remediation” as Justifications for Race-Conscious Government Action, 87 WASH. U. L.
REV. 907, 936–37 (2010) (“[D]iversity programs should in theory be relevant so long as we believe
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action jurisprudence establishes that the end of affirmative action is
more likely a question of when, rather than if. Indeed, the Court’s
2003 opinion in Grutter stated that “[w]e expect that 25 years from
now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further
the interest approved today.”247 Even if the Court does not demand
that all affirmative action in selective admissions end in 2028 because
this statement “reflected an expectation . . . rather than a holding or a
mere hope” that affirmative action will one day no longer be needed,248 the Court has consistently required the use of race to be of a limited duration.249 This requirement helps to move society to the day
when government consideration of race will end and reinforces the requirement that race should only be considered as long as it is necessary.250 Therefore, although Fisher II’s guidance and assistance to institutions may help to extend affirmative action beyond 2028,251 the
Court has already tolled the death knell for affirmative action.252 In
addition, as I explored above, the ways that Fisher II reinforces and

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
that pluralism is relevant to the excellence and success of the government program at issue.” Id.
at 937.); Eang L. Ngov, When “the Evil Day” Comes, Will Title VII’s Disparate Impact Provision
Be Narrowly Tailored to Survive an Equal Protection Clause Challenge?, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 535,
581 (2011) (“If diversity is necessary in order to train competent professionals, for example, it is
necessary at any and all times; there is no intrinsic time horizon when this need for diversity will
disappear.” (quoting Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term — Foreword: Fashioning the
Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 67 n.306 (2003))); Christopher
J. Schmidt, Caught in a Paradox: Problems with Grutter’s Expectation that Race-Conscious Admissions Programs Will End in Twenty-Five Years, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 753, 763 (2004) (“In fact,
diversity has no built-in time horizon: if diversity is necessary for the quality of education now, it
is necessary at all times.”).
247 539 U.S. 306, 343 (2003).
248 Joel K. Goldstein, Justice O’Connor’s Twenty-Five Year Expectation: The Legitimacy of Durational Limits in Grutter, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 83, 104 (2006); see also THE CIVIL RIGHTS
PROJECT, HARVARD UNIV., REAFFIRMING DIVERSITY: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION CASES 11 (2003), https://civilrightsproject.ucla
.edu /le g al -d eve lo pmen ts/l egal-m e mos/r e af firmi n g- diversi t y- a-l egal - an al ysis - of-the -u niversi t y-o f
-michigan-affirmative-action-cases/law-scholars-reaffirming-diversity-2003.pdf [https://perma.cc
/ZWQ7-GWUE] (“This sentence should be construed as the Court’s dictum expressing, by reference to the passage of time since the Bakke decision, its aspiration — and not its mandate — that
there will be enough progress in equal educational opportunity that race-conscious policies will, at
some point in the future, be unnecessary to ensure diversity.”).
249 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342; Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237–38 (1995);
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 510 (1989) (plurality opinion).
250 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341–43.
251 See supra text accompanying note 88.
252 MARK R. KILLENBECK, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND DIVERSITY: THE BEGINNING OF
THE END? OR THE END OF THE BEGINNING? 20 (2004), https://www.ets.org/Media/Research
/pdf/PICAFFACTNDIVSTY.pdf [https://perma.cc/QG4K-GQT5]; Cordes, supra note 89, at 742;
Ashlee Richman, The End of Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Twenty-Five Years in the
Making?, 4 DEPAUL J. FOR SOC. JUST. 61, 95 (2010).

2016]

THE SUPREME COURT — COMMENTS

225

strengthens the demanding evidentiary burden for affirmative action
may help to usher in its demise.253
Neither Fisher I nor Fisher II explicitly mentioned the durational
requirement or discussed how the Court will examine this requirement
in the future. In Fisher I, Justice Kennedy reminded the University
that despite some measure of deference to universities on whether pursuing the benefits of diversity was essential to the University’s mission,
“[t]he higher education dynamic does not change the narrow tailoring
analysis of strict scrutiny applicable in other contexts.”254 In Fisher II,
Justice Kennedy noted that the University engages in periodic review
of its admissions program and thus perhaps viewed this as sufficient to
satisfy Grutter’s durational limit requirement, which merely required
“sunset provisions in race-conscious admissions policies and periodic
reviews to determine whether racial preferences are still necessary to
achieve student body diversity.”255 Justice Kennedy twice admonished
the University to continue to review data to assess whether its admissions approach is fair, to determine if changing demographics have reduced the need to consider race, and to study the positive and negative
effects of its use of affirmative action.256 Thus, one possible read of
Fisher II is that the Court was satisfied that this requirement was met
in light of its instruction that the University continue its periodic reviews and the fact that 2028 has not yet been reached.
As I argue above, the Court should not consider ending affirmative
action until the opportunity and achievement gaps have narrowed
such that race-neutral admissions typically produce a diverse student
body or until new and effective race-neutral alternatives have been developed.257 This endpoint recognizes that one of the principal reasons
institutions rely on affirmative action is the achievement gap among
applicants.258 However, this suggested endpoint also acknowledges
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
253
254
255
256
257

See supra section I.C, pp. 198–204.
133 S. Ct. 2411, 2421 (2013).
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342; see also Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2209–10.
Fisher II, 136 S. Ct. at 2210, 2214–15.
Supra Part II, pp. 205–37; see also Goldstein, supra note 248, at 95–96 (noting that raceconscious admissions should end only when they “[a]re no longer needed,” id. at 95, and that this
point would be reached “if the performance gap between whites and disadvantaged minorities
disappears so that a system of race-blind admissions produces a diverse class” or when “institutions discover alternative feasible strategies to serve well the interests Grutter recognized,” id. at
96); Vijay S. Sekhon, Maintaining the Legitimacy of the High Court: Understanding the “25
Years” in Grutter v. Bollinger, 3 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 359, 363–64 (2004) (“The evidence leans
strongly against Justice O’Connor’s implied conclusion that the use of race at competitive institutions of higher education will be unnecessary in 25 years to attain a ‘critical mass’ of underrepresented minority students. The sheer magnitude of the gap in grades and test scores is formidable
to say the least.” Id. at 363.).
258 Alan Krueger et al., Race, Income, and College in 25 Years: Evaluating Justice O’Connor’s
Conjecture, 8 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 282, 283 (2006) (“Many colleges and universities attempt to
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that even when the achievement gap closes, institutions may need to
engage in some limited consideration of race to ensure diversity.
Efforts to close achievement gaps must focus first on closing the
opportunity gaps that cause them.259 Therefore, the United States
should undertake a comprehensive reform agenda to close educational
opportunity gaps for its own sake, but also as an aid to reducing or
eliminating the need for affirmative action. I present two critical aspects of this reform agenda here. First, the federal government should
lead the implementation of a comprehensive reform agenda for closing
opportunity and achievement gaps. Second, the Court should revisit
and overturn the Rodriguez decision to provide a federal judicial remedy for disparities in educational opportunity.260 Neither of these responses alone will end the opportunity and achievement gaps that
make affirmative action necessary. However, when considered together, these recommendations could reduce the need for affirmative action
and bring us closer to a day when affirmative action is no longer
needed.
A. Embracing a Comprehensive Federal Response
to the Opportunity and Achievement Gaps
The federal government must establish equal access to an excellent
education as an urgent national priority.261 This goal insists that educational opportunity be distributed based on both student needs and
the common pursuit of excellence for all children in the United States,
rather than based on zip code, class, or race.262 All children deserve
no less than equal access to an excellent education that prepares them
to succeed in postsecondary education or a career and fully nurtures
their abilities.263 The federal government is well equipped to prioritize
educational excellence and equity through the use of the bully pulpit
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
offset the gaps in the credentials of black and white applicants by giving an advantage in admission to black applicants over white applicants with similar academic records.”).
259 See Welner & Carter, supra note 19, at 1–3.
260 These two proposals build on the scholarship that argues that systemic elementary and secondary reform must be undertaken before affirmative action can be eliminated. See Elizabeth S.
Anderson, Integration, Affirmative Action, and Strict Scrutiny, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1195, 1261
(2002); Goldstein, supra note 248, at 142–43; Johnson, supra note 246, at 172–73; see also Schmidt,
supra note 246, at 783–86 (“Since racial discrimination in social life exists, and presumably will
exist in twenty-five years, the abolition of race-conscious programs before that would reestablish
government acquiescence to social inequality under a remedial theory. Therefore, under a remedial theory, only when equality is gained should race-conscious programs be terminated in order
to provide racial neutrality.” Id. at 784 (footnote omitted).).
261 Robinson, supra note 18, at 985–86.
262 See id. at 963–64.
263 See id. at 963. Such an education would include economically and socially integrated
schools whenever possible, in light of research that demonstrates the educational, personal, and
societal benefits of such schools. See id. at 964.
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and multimedia outlets that call attention to this issue.264 Historically,
the federal government has demonstrated its capacity to emphasize the
importance of education reform to the nation, including during the
adoption of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965265
and the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001266 (NCLB).267
To lead this effort, the federal government must draw on its
strengths in education policymaking, as I have discussed in my prior
scholarship proposing a theory for disrupting education federalism.268
I define education federalism as the balance of power between the federal and state government over education that favors state autonomy
over education.269 I propose substantially shifting this balance of
power in ways that enable the federal government to serve as the ultimate guarantor of equity and excellence in education.270 To accomplish this shift, the federal government would build on such strengths
as supporting and disseminating rigorous, objective research on effective state and local approaches for ensuring educational equity and excellence, as well as research on surmounting various obstacles to effective reform.271 The federal government should also supply technical
assistance to states and districts in order to assist them in executing
comprehensive reform.272 NCLB revealed that many state agencies
lacked the expertise to implement substantive education reform and
instead were more accustomed to distributing funding and monitoring
how it was spent.273 Technical assistance can expand the capacity of
states and localities for reform and offer insights from other states and
localities that would encourage greater efficiency in reforms.274 Federal financial assistance also could provide both incentives and assistance for providing equal access to an excellent education.275 Such assistance will be critical for gaining buy-in for comprehensive reform
and for encouraging states and localities to raise the quality of the
most disadvantaged schools rather than lowering the quality of more

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
264
265
266

See id. at 986–88.
Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20
U.S.C.).
267 See Robinson, supra note 18, at 987–88.
268 See id. at 983–1005.
269 Id. at 962.
270 Id. at 1002–05.
271 See id. at 994–96.
272 See id. at 996–98.
273 See id. at 997 (citing PAUL MANNA, COLLISION COURSE: FEDERAL EDUCATION POLICY MEETS STATE AND LOCAL REALITIES 49 (2011)).
274 Id.
275 Id. at 998.
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privileged schools.276 My theory also adds a needed layer of federal
accountability for equitable distribution of an excellent education.277
By undertaking this substantial shift in education federalism, the
United States could implement a comprehensive education reform
agenda that ensures equal access to an excellent education.278 Insistence on state and local control of education and limited federal influence has operated as a shield that has insulated states from meaningful
federal accountability, despite the fact that states have refused to implement the extensive reforms that are needed to provide an excellent
and equitable education to all children.279 The nation’s longstanding
approach to education federalism reveals numerous shortcomings that
indicate that a new approach is needed.280 Education federalism has
hindered efforts to advance equal educational opportunity.281 For instance, education federalism drove the Court’s insistence on a quick
return to local control of public schools after a relatively short desegregation effort to remedy the longstanding denial and segregation of
education for African American children.282 Education federalism also
limited the ability of Congress to establish a national floor for state
standards or for teachers in NCLB and thus left the states free to
adopt relatively weak academic and teacher-qualification standards.283
Education federalism’s emphasis on state and local control of education also has not reaped some of the benefits that it is designed to
achieve.284 State and local control can encourage excellence, experimentalism, and responsiveness to local needs.285 However, local control is not an end in itself but merely a method for achieving these
benefits.286 For example, the funding systems of most states do not
distribute greater funding to districts with higher concentrations of
poverty, despite research demonstrating that students in these districts
need additional resources to compete successfully with their more priv-

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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See id. at 998–99.
See id. at 1016.
Id. at 972–1005.
Id. at 978–79.
See id. at 972–83.
Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The High Cost of Education Federalism, 48 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 287, 297–305, 309–11, 324–30 (2013).
282 Id. at 297–305.
283 Id. at 324–30.
284 See Robinson, supra note 18, at 972–76.
285 See id. at 970–71 (citing, inter alia, New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
286 DOUGLAS S. REED, ON EQUAL TERMS: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 179–80 (2001).
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ileged peers.287 Instead, fourteen states deliver less funding to districts
with greater concentrations of poverty, eighteen states deliver the same
funding, and only sixteen states provide more funding.288 This reveals
a fundamental unwillingness, or at least an inability, of most states to
meet the educational needs of students within their states and to distribute funding in an equitable manner. Research also demonstrates
that many states provide quite low per-pupil funding levels289 and do
not include mechanisms for overseeing the efficient use of resources.290
Students within the United States at all income levels perform significantly and pervasively below their international peers in Asia, Europe,
and some other countries in the Americas.291 This evidence indicates
that the laboratory of the states is generally failing to provide the excellent and equitable schools that the nation’s schoolchildren need and
deserve and that the United States needs to thrive.
Local control has greatly diminished in recent decades and thus enjoys only a circumscribed existence in school districts today.292 Nevertheless, local control that sparks innovation, parental and teacher involvement, and tailoring of educational opportunities to the needs of
children must be maintained. While beneficial forms of state and local
control of education should be preserved,293 the United States must
simultaneously declare that the autonomy to shortchange some children while privileging others has come to an end. Instead, the United
States should adopt a new understanding of education federalism that
embraces federal leadership for a federal-state partnership that ensures
equal access to an excellent education for all children.
Despite federalism-based concerns over this increase in federal influence over education as too great a reduction in state and local control, my approach would retain a number of features that recognize
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
287 See David G. Sciarra & Danielle Farrie, From Rodriguez to Abbott: New Jersey’s
Standards-Linked School Funding Reform, in THE ENDURING LEGACY OF RODRIGUEZ, supra
note 18, at 119, 120–21.
288 BRUCE BAKER ET AL., IS SCHOOL FUNDING FAIR? A NATIONAL REPORT CARD 5 (5th
ed. 2016), http://www.schoolfundingfairness.org/National_Report_Card_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc
/M3GH-PSM8] (surveying funding in forty-eight states).
289 See id. at 3–4; Allan R. Odden et al., A 50-State Strategy to Achieve School Finance Adequacy, 24 EDUC. POL’Y 628, 646–47 (2010).
290 See ULRICH BOSER, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, RETURN ON EDUCATIONAL INVESTMENT: 2014: A DISTRICT-BY-DISTRICT EVALUATION OF U.S. EDUCATIONAL PRODUCTIVITY 27 (2014), h t t p s : / / c d n . a m e r i c a n p r o g r e s s . o r g / w p - c o n t e n t / u p l o a d s / 2 0 1 4 / 0 7 / R O I - r e p o r t . p d f
[https://perma.cc/FF33-DP73]; EQUITY & EXCELLENCE COMM’N, supra note 139, at 17.
291 Lawrence H. Summers, Foreword to ERIC A. HANUSHEK, PAUL E. PETERSON &
LUDGER WOESSMANN, ENDANGERING PROSPERITY: A GLOBAL VIEW OF THE AMERICAN
SCHOOL, at vii (2013); HANUSHEK, PETERSON & WOESSMAN, supra, at 39, 43–45, 51–52.
292 See James E. Ryan, The Tenth Amendment and Other Paper Tigers: The Legal Boundaries of
Education Governance, in WHO’S IN CHARGE HERE? THE TANGLED WEB OF SCHOOL
GOVERNANCE AND POLICY 42, 60 (Noel Epstein ed., 2004).
293 See Robinson, supra note 18, at 1014–16.
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federalism’s potential benefits. My proposal retains most of the existing forms of state and local control of education. It does not embrace
a national schoolhouse or federalize our education system. Instead, it
insists that states equitably distribute educational opportunities and
provide all children an excellent education. In addition, my theory for
disrupting education federalism would empower new forms of state
and local control for those communities who have lacked the influence
to demand an excellent and equitable education for their children.294
This theory admittedly and intentionally ends a state’s ability to distribute resources in an inequitable and irrational manner that harms
both disadvantaged children and the nation’s interest in an educated
citizenry and workforce. However, states would retain primary control
of education as each state would select the best path for it to ensure
equal access to an excellent education.
B. Overturning Rodriguez
To be most effective, a comprehensive federal agenda requires the
assistance of all three branches of government. The executive branch
enjoys the fewest obstacles to reform because it could use its existing
authority to accomplish incremental shifts to education federalism
through modest reforms that employ its existing authority and resources.295 Nevertheless, given the full scope of the shift to education
federalism that I recommend, reforms instituted without any significant involvement of Congress or the Court would lack the comprehensive nature that ensuring equal access to an excellent education for all
schoolchildren will ultimately demand. Legislation consistent with this
agenda would send an even more powerful message that the agenda
represents the will of the people and thus may encourage greater state
and local buy-in.296 However, the eight-year delay in reenacting the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, which eventually
led to the reduction of the federal role in education in the Every Student Succeeds Act,297 and the great difficulties that Congress is experiencing in passing legislation298 suggest that legislative reform consistent with my proposal is unlikely in the near term.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
294
295
296

See id. at 1014–15.
Robinson, supra note 141, at 25, 34–35.
For my preliminary thoughts on a possible legislative agenda that implements my theory for
disrupting education federalism, see id. at 233–49.
297 Valerie Strauss, The Successor to No Child Left Behind Has, It Turns Out, Big Problems of
Its Own, WASH. POST: ANSWER SHEET (Dec. 7, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news
/ a n s w e r - s h e e t / wp / 2 0 1 5 / 1 2 / 0 7/ t h e - s u c c e s s o r - t o - n o - c h i l d - l e f t - b e h i n d - h a s - i t - t u r n s - o u t - b i g - p r o b l e m s
-of-its-own [https://perma.cc/J8J4-E4AS].
298 See generally Josh Blackman, The Supreme Court, 2015 Term — Comment: Gridlock, 130
HARV. L. REV. 241 (2016).
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Fortunately, the Court possesses the authority to unleash a powerful tool that could help to reduce the opportunity and achievement
gaps that lead universities and colleges to rely on affirmative action in
admissions. It could overturn Rodriguez, which held that the Constitution does not protect education as a fundamental right.299
For over forty years, Rodriguez has served as a roadblock to access
to federal courts for those who hope to address the entrenched disparities in funding and resources that relegate many disadvantaged and
minority students to inferior educational opportunities in the United
States.300 Because the Court held that education was not a fundamental right, Rodriguez applied rational basis review to the funding gaps
between districts within Texas.301 The Court determined that Texas
easily met this standard because its funding approach advanced local
control of education, the Court lacked the expertise to second-guess the
Texas system, and a ruling for the plaintiffs would greatly upset the
balance of federalism.302 The Court nonetheless noted the need for
reform of school funding and challenged the states to undertake this
reform.303 Although many states have implemented funding reform
since Rodriguez and state litigation has resulted in some important victories, these state efforts have fallen far short of the reforms required
to provide all children equal access to an excellent education.304 In
light of the continuing disparities in educational opportunity, numerous scholars, myself included, have argued that Rodriguez was wrongly decided and should be overturned to provide a consistent and powerful federal remedy to address these disparities.305
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
299 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973). In making this argument, I agree with now–California Supreme
Court Justice Liu’s contention that overturning Rodriguez could serve as a possible avenue for
addressing the inequalities within elementary and secondary education that make affirmative action necessary. See Goodwin Liu, Brown, Bollinger, and Beyond, 47 HOW. L.J. 705, 765–66
(2004). My argument differs from Justice Liu’s because I recommend overturning Rodriguez as
one approach for providing equal access to an excellent education while Justice Liu recommends
overturning Rodriguez as a way “to eliminate at least the most egregious disparities.” Id. at 766.
I disagree that eliminating only the most egregious educational disparities is a viable avenue for
meaningful progress toward equal educational opportunity. In addition, my recommendation for
overturning Rodriguez is merely one component of a comprehensive approach that involves action by the legislative and executive branches as well as universities and colleges.
300 Ogletree & Robinson, supra note 18, at 264.
301 411 U.S. at 37, 44, 54–55.
302 See id. at 47–50, 54–55.
303 See id. at 58.
304 Ogletree & Robinson, supra note 18, at 269–70; Michael A. Rebell, Rodriguez Past, Present,
and Future, in THE ENDURING LEGACY OF RODRIGUEZ, supra note 18, at 65, 72–73.
305 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Lost Opportunity: The Burger Court and the Failure to
Achieve Equal Educational Opportunity, 45 MERCER L. REV. 999, 1009–11 (1994) (arguing that
Rodriguez and Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974), are the cases that caused the Court to fail
to protect equal educational opportunity); Liu, supra note 299, at 765–66; Ogletree & Robinson,
supra note 18, at 264 (arguing that Rodriguez was wrongly decided and that a federal forum is
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However, disagreement exists over the scope of the right that the
Court should recognize. The Court left the existence of a fundamental
right to some minimum education an open question in Rodriguez306
and subsequently acknowledged that the question remains open.307 If
Rodriguez is overturned, some scholars envision the Court addressing
only extreme forms of educational inequality by providing a federal
right to a minimally adequate education.308 Leading education scholar
Professor Derek Black, on the other hand, has argued that such an education today would require that students receive the state-defined
minimum of education and that this definition does not have to equal
“a minimalist education.”309
Given the likelihood that the Court will insist that affirmative action eventually end, the Court should take some responsibility for addressing the conditions that lead institutions to rely on affirmative action by overturning the decision that insulated opportunity gaps from
federal accountability. The Court could choose from a variety of constitutional provisions to recognize a right to education.310 For in–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
needed to close the educational opportunity gaps in the United States); Rebell, supra note 304, at
65–68.
306 See 411 U.S. at 35–37.
307 See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 285 (1986).
308 See, e.g., Julius Chambers, Adequate Education for All: A Right, an Achievable Goal, 22
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 55, 68–72 (1987); Edward B. Foley, Rodriguez Revisited: Constitutional
Theory and School Finance, 32 GA. L. REV. 475, 479–80 (1998); Barry Friedman & Sara Solow,
The Federal Right to an Adequate Education, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 92, 149 (2013); Liu, supra
note 299, at 765–67; Thomas J. Walsh, Education as a Fundamental Right Under the United
States Constitution, 29 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 279, 296 (1993); Matthew A. Brunell, Note, What
Lawrence Brought for “Show and Tell”: The Non-Fundamental Liberty Interest in a Minimally
Adequate Education, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 343, 366 (2005).
309 Derek Black, Unlocking the Power of State Constitutions with Equal Protection: The First
Step Toward Education as a Federally Protected Right, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1343, 1408
(2010).
310 See generally Susan H. Bitensky, Theoretical Foundations for a Right to Education Under
the U.S. Constitution: A Beginning to the End of the National Education Crisis, 86 NW. U. L.
REV. 550, 574–630 (1992) (providing an excellent discussion of the possible textual sources for a
federal constitutional right to education). A full exploration of the possible constitutional sources
for a right to education is beyond the scope of this Comment. For examples of scholarly arguments in favor of a constitutional right to education, see Friedman & Solow, supra note 308, at
119 (“When one looks to Due Process Clause cases, one finds not only an open question, but a jurisprudential basis for a federal right to education.”); Areto A. Imoukhuede, Education Rights and
the New Due Process, 47 IND. L. REV. 467, 467 (2014) (arguing “for a human dignity-based, due
process clause analysis to recognize the fundamental duty of government to provide high quality,
public education”); Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality, and National Citizenship, 116 YALE L.J.
330, 335 (2006) (arguing that a federal right to “adequate educational opportunity for equal citizenship” exists within the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Michael A. Rebell,
The Right to Comprehensive Educational Opportunity, 47 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 47, 90 (2012)
(“[L]ow-income students should have a strong claim, under all three tiers of the Supreme Court’s
equal protection analysis, to meaningful educational opportunities that include a range of comprehensive services.”); Kara A. Millonzi, Recent Development, Education as a Right of National
Citizenship Under the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 81 N.C. L.
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stance, the Court could hold that the Fourteenth Amendment’s requirement that states not deny equal protection of the laws311 serves as
a prohibition of the inequitable state disparities in educational opportunity or guarantees students an education that enables them to effectively employ their First Amendment rights and to be competent voters.312 Recognizing and enforcing a federal right to education would
provide greater authority and consistent impact than the state education clauses that vary widely in their protection — or lack thereof —
of the right to education.313 The federal courts have been and will remain an important and powerful avenue for enforcing education rights
for all students throughout the United States in ways that do not make
the content of a right dependent on the happenstance of geography or
state law.314 A federal constitutional right also would enable the federal courts to address the substantial interstate disparities in funding
that currently account for seventy-eight percent of per-pupil spending
gaps.315 This tremendous interstate disparity, which has reached a

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
REV. 1286, 1311 (2003) (“The recognition of the right to education under the Privileges or Immunities Clause suggests that public school systems that fail to provide an adequate education to our
nation’s youth are unconstitutional. Thus, because educational inadequacy is often linked to lack
of financial resources, public school funding systems that fail to provide sufficient financial resources are constitutionally suspect.”).
311 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
312 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 83–84, 89 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); Rebell, supra note 304, at 76–78; see also Black, supra note 309, at 1415–16 (arguing
that the Equal Protection Clause requires federal courts and Congress to “engage to ensure that
the rights states have extended to children are delivered on an equitable and consistent basis,” id.
at 1415, and that bringing federal enforcement to existing states’ rights could “provide the basis
and impetus for the eventual recognition of education as a fundamental right, and further federal
support of education,” id. at 1416); Robert P. Moses, Constitutional Property v. Constitutional
People, in QUALITY EDUCATION AS A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT: CREATING A GRASSROOTS
MOVEMENT TO TRANSFORM PUBLIC SCHOOLS 70, 90 (Theresa Perry et al. eds., 2010) (“In the
twenty-first century we should pick our constitution up with the concept of a constitutional person thick enough to obligate the nation to secure for all its children a quality public school education as a matter of course, a matter of history, and a matter of our constitutional democracy.”);
Penelope A. Prevolos, Rodriguez Revisited: Federalism, Meaningful Access, and the Right to Adequate Education, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 75, 119–20 (1980) (arguing that the Fourteenth
Amendment could provide a constitutional basis for a federal right to education).
313 Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, Introduction: The Enduring Legacy
of San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, in THE ENDURING LEGACY OF
RODRIGUEZ, supra note 18, at 1, 12–15; Rebell, supra note 304, at 72–73.
314 See JACK JENNINGS, PRESIDENTS, CONGRESS, AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS: THE
POLITICS OF EDUCATION REFORM 206–08 (2015).
315 See Nora E. Gordon, The Changing Federal Role in Education Finance and Governance, in
HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH IN EDUCATION FINANCE AND POLICY 317, 331 (Helen F. Ladd
& Margaret E. Goertz eds., 2d ed. 2015); see also JENNINGS, supra note 314, at 208 (explaining
how a federal constitutional right to education could address interstate disparities in educational
opportunity).
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“historic high” for spending differences,316 reveals the failure of state
courts to close spending gaps on their own.317
If the Court chooses to overturn Rodriguez in a manner that would
help to close opportunity gaps, it should incorporate four essential
principles into a constitutional right to education. First, the Court
must embrace a robust fundamental right to education that moves beyond guaranteeing a rudimentary floor of educational opportunity. A
minimal right would not make a meaningful impact on opportunity or
achievement gaps. Instead, the Court should consider recognizing a
right to education that requires states to provide an education-based
justification for the quality of education provided and any disparities
in educational opportunity. Such a standard would enable states to offer disparate opportunities to students with disabilities, Englishlanguage learners, and low-income children, but would force states to
end the superior opportunities that are provided to wealthier children
absent an educational justification for such disparities. Defining a
fundamental right to education in this way would help to level the
playing field within public schools and insist that states design education systems based on research and students’ needs rather than power,
politics, and privilege.
Second, the Court should include safeguards that reduce the likelihood that states level down their educational opportunities318 or seek
to avoid the Court’s requirements.319 One safeguard could be an instruction to states that guaranteeing a federal right to education should
avoid reducing the quality and nature of existing educational opportunities and instead should seek ways to expand the delivery of a highquality education to those who are currently denied it. The Court also
can reduce the likelihood of decreasing the quality of educational opportunities within a state by providing clear requirements on the nature of the education right. In this regard, the Court can learn from
decades of school finance litigation that has worked to give meaning to
the right to education embodied in state constitutions,320 while recog–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
316
317
318

Gordon, supra note 315, at 331.
See Rebell, supra note 304, at 72–73, 85.
Compare RYAN, supra note 139, at 175–76 (noting that some favoring funding reform raise
concerns that suits that seek equity in funding will cause a state to level down spending but that
“the evidence for this proposition is . . . thin” and that despite concerns that such a reduction occurred in California, other successful lawsuits have not caused a leveling down), with Joshua E.
Weishart, Transcending Equity Versus Adequacy, 66 STAN. L. REV. 477, 501–02 (2014) (noting
that overall spending leveled down in some states after some successful equity school funding litigation).
319 States took such evasive action after the Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education
(Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 300–01 (1955). Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, Resurrecting the Promise of
Brown: Understanding and Remedying How the Supreme Court Reconstitutionalized Segregated
Schools, 88 N.C. L. REV. 787, 797–803 (2010).
320 See generally Weishart, supra note 318.
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nizing that this litigation has had significant shortcomings and has not
ultimately resulted in equal access to an excellent education for all
children.321
Third, the Court must acknowledge that a constitutional right to
education would shift education federalism in ways that would increase federal influence over education and reduce some aspects of
state control over education. The Court must wrestle with its own
prior pronouncements heralding the importance of local control of education.322 Such a shift in an area of traditional state control must be
justified with an explanation for why this shift is both appropriate and
warranted.323
When the Court provides this explanation, it should remind the
states that Rodriguez urged state reform of school finance systems in
light of the persistent and heavy reliance on property taxes and the
disparities in educational opportunity.324 The limited nature and impact of subsequent reforms remains apparent in light of the Equity
and Excellence Commission’s finding in 2013 that “students, families
and communities are burdened by the broken system of education
funding in America.”325 The Commission further noted that over forty
years of reforms “have not addressed the fundamental sources of inequities and so have not generated the educational gains desired.”326
Scholars also have recognized the limited success of decades of funding
litigation to remedy longstanding inequitable disparities in educational
opportunity.327 School funding data and research also confirm a
host of shortcomings in state funding systems despite the Court’s invitation to reform funding in ways that increase equal educational
opportunities.328
In addition to the shortcomings noted above, most states have not
designed their funding systems to accomplish their education goals.329
Instead, politics oftentimes drives the distribution of funding as state
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
321
322

RYAN, supra note 139, at 153; Rebell, supra note 304, at 72–73.
See Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 489–90 (1992); Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 248
(1991); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741–42 (1974); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 51–53 (1973).
323 For an extensive discussion of why education federalism should be reexamined and shifted
toward greater federal influence over education, see Robinson, supra note 18, at 972–85.
324 Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 58–59.
325 EQUITY & EXCELLENCE COMM’N, supra note 139, at 17.
326 Id. at 19.
327 See RYAN, supra note 139, at 153; Black, supra note 309, at 1370–71 (acknowledging that
litigation has reduced some funding disparities and increased funding for education but that inequities persist and students are not yet provided the education that they need to reach high outcomes); Robinson, supra note 18, 978–80.
328 Robinson, supra note 141, at 6–20.
329 See Sciarra & Farrie, supra note 287, at 125; Paul T. Hill, Spending Money When It Is Not
Clear What Works, 83 PEABODY J. EDUC. 238, 239 (2008).
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politicians assess how much funding is available for a given school
year and then bargain over how that amount should be divided among
the students in the state.330 When the Court acknowledges that its decision will result in a shift in education federalism, it also should
acknowledge that the laboratory of the states has failed to develop the
reforms needed to ensure an equitable and excellent education for every child.
Fourth, the Court must acknowledge that recognizing a constitutional right to education would only begin the process of closing opportunity and achievement gaps. The reform of funding systems and
the redistribution of educational opportunity will take a significant
amount of time. The Court will need to encourage lower courts to retain jurisdiction over cases enforcing this right, just as state courts
typically retain jurisdiction over cases enforcing a state right to
education.331
In this regard, the Court must avoid the errors of its desegregation
cases, which initially insisted on effective desegregation in the late
1960s and early 1970s,332 but then eventually emphasized the return to
local control of schools rather than the effectiveness of desegregation
orders. For example, in Milliken v. Bradley,333 the Court overturned
an interdistrict desegregation plan for the metropolitan Detroit area in
part because the plan’s inclusion of districts surrounding Detroit
would cause a reduction in local control.334 The Court took this action
in spite of the Sixth Circuit’s finding that crossing district boundaries
was particularly appropriate given the state’s discrimination that
maintained racial segregation across school district boundaries and
that failing to include the surrounding districts would “nullify” Brown
v. Board of Education.335 As I have explored in prior work, the
Court’s desegregation decisions in Board of Education of Oklahoma
City Public Schools v. Dowell,336 Freeman v. Pitts,337 and Missouri v.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
330 See BETTY COX ET AL., THE COSTS OF EDUCATION: REVENUE AND SPENDING IN
PUBLIC, PRIVATE AND CHARTER SCHOOLS 158 (2013); Bruce D. Baker, How State Aid Formulas Undermine Educational Equity in States, in THE STEALTH INEQUITIES OF SCHOOL
FUNDING: HOW STATE AND LOCAL SCHOOL FINANCE SYSTEMS PERPETUATE INEQUITABLE STUDENT SPENDING 13, 37 (Bruce D. Baker & Sean P. Corcoran eds., 2012).
331 See, e.g., Abbott ex rel. Abbott v. Burke, 693 A.2d 417, 421–25 (N.J. 1997) (describing multiple decisions from the case’s history in state court); Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State,
801 N.E.2d 326, 328–29 (N.Y. 2003) (same); DeRolph v. State, 754 N.E.2d 1184, 1188 (Ohio 2001)
(same).
332 See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15, 26 (1971); Green v.
Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438–39, 438 n.4 (1968).
333 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
334 Id. at 741–44.
335 Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 249 (6th Cir. 1973) (en banc), rev’d, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
336 498 U.S. 237, 249–50 (1991).
337 503 U.S. 467, 489 (1992).
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Jenkins338 also reified local control of the schools by focusing on releasing districts from court supervision rather than on effective and lasting
school desegregation.339 Scholars have documented how these cases
signaled that the Court had determined that desegregation had gone
on long enough and it was time for school boards to regain control
even if desegregation was never ultimately accomplished.340
If a federal right to education is going to serve as a mechanism to
close educational opportunity gaps and to reduce the need for selective
institutions to rely on consideration of an applicant’s race to achieve
diversity’s benefits, the Court must learn from how its desegregation
decisions undeniably contributed to the racial isolation that pervades
so many school districts today.341 The Court’s impatience with the
slow nature of desegregation reveals a shallow understanding of the
depth of the social ill that the Court declared unconstitutional in
Brown and an unwillingness to insist upon ongoing federal court
investment in the effective dismantling of segregation. Overturning
Rodriguez will require the Court to confront longstanding and deeply
entrenched inequalities within public education. The federal courts
will be called upon to oversee reforms that topple the settled expectations of more privileged sectors of society, just as the Court confronted
the expectations of racism and white privilege that supported racial
segregation. Thus, the reforms required by the Court cannot give a
wink and a nod to those who benefit from the status quo while simultaneously claiming to demand reform.
The Court must eschew any approval of unwarranted delay, as occurred in Brown II’s command to desegregate with “all deliberate
speed,”342 or any invitation to incomplete or ineffective results, as
the Court sanctioned in Dowell, Freeman, and Jenkins.343 Instead, the
Court must insist that states implement the reforms that will ensure
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equal access to an excellent education. It must make clear that states
will not be released from court oversight until they have done so.
Consistent Supreme Court insistence on an excellent and equitable education for all children will provide lower federal courts the support
that they will need both to confront state legislatures that resist changing the status quo and to prevent evasive actions similar to those invited by the Court’s ambiguous pronouncements in Brown II.344
In sum, a federal right to education that embraces these principles
provides the most promising path toward closing opportunity and
achievement gaps such that selective postsecondary institutions may
not be required to consider race to achieve diversity’s benefits.345 Unless the Court overturns Rodriguez, the Court will remain complicit
with the deeply entrenched educational opportunity gaps and should
not blame postsecondary institutions that must build diverse institutions despite those gaps.
CONCLUSION
Fisher I and II wear two faces: one nodding approvingly at the
University of Texas’s plan and another casting a skeptical eye toward
future challenges. On one face, Fisher II placed the Court’s imprimatur on the admissions plan at the University in ways that will enable it
to serve as a guide for other institutions that must defend their use of
affirmative action.346 Fisher II’s analysis regarding the absence of a
need to reduce the goal of diversity to actual numbers, the types of evidence that the Court will consider persuasive, and the deficiencies of
percentage plans can assist institutions that employ affirmative action.
Yet the Fisher decisions’ other face is one that reinforced and
strengthened the evidentiary requirements in Grutter in ways that may
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344 See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 354–56 (2004).
345 Additionally, Congress could take a variety of actions to support the Court’s recognition of a
constitutional right to education. Congress could embrace the Court’s requirements as conditions
on funding in the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 or on any education funding,
authorize grants to support reform, extend funding for the DOE to enforce new conditions, and
monitor DOE enforcement of the conditions. See Robinson, supra note 141, (manuscript at 34–
49) (proposing congressional mechanisms that could lead states to offer equal access to an excellent education); Robinson, supra note 18, at 1006–12 (describing how Congress can still expand
the federal role in education despite the limits NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012), placed on
congressional spending). The executive branch could issue an executive order on the importance
of compliance with the Court’s decision recognizing a federal right to education, establish a commission to study and recommend effective responses, enforce any statutory conditions on education funding, and modify education regulations and guidance consistent with the Court’s pronouncements. These efforts would provide critical support for the Court’s decision to recognize a
constitutional right to education by overturning Rodriguez. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
346 See 136 S. Ct. at 2210–14.

2016]

THE SUPREME COURT — COMMENTS

239

make it more difficult for institutions to succeed in constitutional challenges. Ending any possible deference in the narrow tailoring analysis,
proving the absence of any viable race-neutral alternatives, expecting
numerous types of data to justify the decision to consider race, and
identifying the limited impact of race as a “hallmark” of narrow tailoring for affirmative action may create new hurdles for defending affirmative action.347
The best response to the mixed message of the Fisher cases is to
examine and remedy the root causes that lead institutions to rely on
affirmative action. Educational opportunity gaps serve as a primary
impetus for enduring achievement gaps.348 As long as opportunity
gaps persist, postsecondary institutions could consider educational disadvantage as a positive race-neutral admissions factor that may help
them advance diversity. Such an approach might enable an institution
to reduce or eliminate its consideration of an applicant’s race, or at
minimum provide further evidence that it examined all race-neutral
alternatives.
The United States has not undertaken a comprehensive and sustained effort to ensure that all children receive equal access to an excellent education.349 Furthermore, although the Court has insisted
that affirmative action must eventually end,350 Rodriguez closed the
federal courthouse to challenges to disparities in educational opportunity.351 Ultimately, the federal government must undertake a comprehensive effort that partners with states and localities to ensure
equal access to an excellent education. The Court should overturn
Rodriguez as an important component of this comprehensive effort.
Until educational opportunity and achievement gaps are closed, the
Court should not insist on an end to affirmative action.
Even if the Court declared its willingness for affirmative action to
continue indefinitely, the United States should undertake comprehensive reforms that ensure equal access to an excellent education as a
matter of fundamental fairness,352 economic self-interest,353 democratic
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engagement,354 national security,355 and moral imperative.356 The consequences that the United States currently suffers from its mediocre
education system are much too costly357 and too often are disproportionately borne by those who are socioeconomically disadvantaged,
people of color, or both.358 The urgent need for comprehensive education reform is also undeniable given research showing that even relatively privileged children are performing poorly compared to their international peers.359 The United States holds within its grasp the
power to change the destiny of its children and ultimately the nation.
Let us work tirelessly to urge the United States to take hold of this
power with both hands and to insist on an excellent and equitable education for all of its children.
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